North Korea, China, and World War III

North Korea is often described as 'pariah state', or even as the 'hermit kingdom.' Indeed, its people live a 'sheltered' life, in the sense that almost all external influences are mediated and banished by the D.P.R.K. state. Kim Jong-il, preceded by his father Kim il-Sung and potentially succeeded by son Kim Jong-un, is often portrayed as the 'crazy dictator', with exotic tastes in fine liquors and cinema, his finger supposedly poised over the nuclear button.

However, Kim Jong-il is not the 'madman' portrayed by the Western media, and in fact is a very skilled identity entrepreneur. In spite of all predictions of the collapse of the North Korean war, particularly since drastic reductions in Russian aid following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea has survived.

The pervasive cult of personality surrounding Kim il-Sung related to his days as a revolutionary soldier, sent to fight in China to support Communist Mao' Zedong's battle against the Nationalists led by Chang Kai-Shek (who went on to form the Taipei government).

However, Kim Jong-il had no such glorious military past, and as such, a 'void' existed in how exactly to engender support (the extent to which this is consent or coercion is unknown) from the masses arose.

'Juche' arose. This is the ideological glue that now binds together the entirety of North Korea. Derived from Confucian philosophy, Juche broadly means a 'self-reliance', or that North Korea (occupied for much of its history) is proudly independent, and needs no great power to support it.

This, in reality, could not be further from the truth. North Korea is hugely dependent on China, which makes up 73% of the foreign trade, 90% of the oil, 80% of the consumer goods, and 45% of the food which North Korea consumes.

Kim Jong-il's reign is less secure than many believe. His loosening grip on the exchange of information, brought about by black market radio, TVs and phones from China, means North Koreans are increasingly able to access outside information - indeed, South Korean soaps are becoming increasing popular. It is thus no longer possible to keep up the pretence that the North enjoys a superior standard of living; the wealth and luxury enjoyed in Seoul contrasts with the omnipresent threat of famine in Pyongyang.

As such, North Korea's deepening dependence on China is increasingly exposed. Unsurprisingly, this troubles Kim Jong-il, already unnerved by developments taking place over which he has decreasing influence, and takes every opportunity possible to distance himself from China (which Beijing understands, and permits to an extent).

The shelling of the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong in late November 2010 is a prime example of this. It could be argued that this attack had very little to do with Seoul and South Korea, and much more to do with the external population of North Korea. Determined to show his subjects North Korea's independence from China, the 'Great Leader' opened fire upon this tiny island, with South Korea promising that any future aggression from the North will lead to a response from Seoul.

However, another attack is inevitable. As Kim's grip over the population weakens, he will be increasingly likely to act aggressively on the international stage to reinforce the image of juche, or North Korean independence.

North Korea arguably holds more influence over China than any other nation in the world. The collapse of the North Korean would have devastating consequences for China, and as such Beijing is willing to accept North Korean belligerence, and wields its veto in the United Nations Security Council to prevent anti-D.P.R.K. resolutions and statements being passed.

The first reason Beijing fears the fall of Kim Jong-il is that, invariably, South Korea would be focused on rebuilding civil society and basic infrastructure in the North after any potential collapse. As such, South Korean Foreign Direct Investment (F.D.I.) in China would drop significantly, and would have undesirable economic consequences for China, particularly in its acquisition of foreign currencies.

Secondly, there would be demographic consequences for China if North Korea collapsed. China's overpopulation issue is nothing new; the one-child policy has been in effect for many decades. As such, an influx of refugees over the North Korean border would create significant population issues for China, upsetting a finely-poised population-balancing act.

China, deeply mistrustful of U.S. ally Japan, firstly for atrocities committed during the World War II at Nanjing for which Tokyo has never acknowledged guilt, and secondly for Japanese and American thinly-veiled support for Taiwanese independence from China, is unlikely to support Western policy toward North Korea anytime soon unless there is a drastic rapprochement with Japan.

A South Korean response to the next attack from Pyongyang is highly likely, and it is anybody's guess just how far this escalation will lead - will the U.S. live up to its treaty commitments and support the South militarily? If it does, we could be watching the beginnings of a major international crisis, particularly given the presence of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.