“The elephant
has started to trot.” - Kunal Sen
Introduction
India, long seen as the ‘elephant economy’, in other words economically
powerful but slow to transform, has seen dramatic change over the past ten
years, and will continue to do so into the near future, as this research paper
will discuss. Indeed, Kunal Sen recently symbolically announced that ‘the
elephant has started to trot.[i]’
This essay will argue very broadly that India’s strength, and thus route to
future success, lies in its society. The uniquely strong tradition of social
activism is one of the major reasons why Indian democracy has succeeded where
other post-colonial democratic states did not, and the sheer number of young
people will continue to act as a catalyst for India’s meteoric development well
beyond the 2010s. However, there are still serious impediments to India’s
growth, and the case will be made that these impediments reside largely within
the ruling governmental and business institutions. Corruption, although
manifest at many levels within society, can be crippling at the governmental
level. In addition, the very nature of Indian coalitions has also often
hampered development – a unique political development in Westminster-style
former British colonies. An important caveat to draw here is that, of course,
India faces a wide range of both challenges and holds innumerable strengths,
and on some occasions it may be difficult to determine whether one particular
aspect is detrimental or beneficial. Rather than attempting to provide a
comprehensive explanation or prediction regarding India’s growth, this paper
merely attempts to shed light on some of the key contemporary issue that arise
on a daily basis in 21st century India. A conclusion will be drawn that
India
Elite corruption in India – persistent, pervasive and potent
The first impediment to India, looking beyond the 2010s, is corruption.
This issue has become a prominent issue on the Indian news agenda, largely
thanks to social activist Anna Hazare, who will be examined in greater depth
later in this essay. Corruption is also certainly not a recent development, not
just in India but all over the world. In India, there is ‘phenomenal,
all-pervasive corruption eating into the vitals of the system.[ii]’
This includes petty corruption; it is estimated that a typical truck driver in
India pays around Rs 200 every day at check posts and octroi centers[iii].
Ultimately, however, it is not this corruption which will hold
back India’s development. Of course, on an individual-level, corruption means
that certain individuals may not be able to pay these illicit levies or
charges, to the detriment of social equality. But, it is the institutional
corruption within large enterprise or even the Indian government that has the
potential to significantly affect the pace and depth of India’s development.
Vittal
argues, with reference to India, that ‘nations where people are habitually more
honest, and less corrupt, will tend to get more investment, trade and business.[iv]’
This argument is highly problematic. The first error it makes is equating
levels of ‘honesty’ with levels of corruption, inferring that some peoples,
perhaps Westerners, are simply more ‘honest’ than others (perhaps the so-called
‘Third World’) thus supposedly explaining the comparative development of the
‘civilized’ West. The statement seems to imply that the reason for corruption
in India is something habitually dishonest about the Indian
people, a both essentialist and Orientalist[v]
statement. Furthermore, it is fatally flawed in itself as a concept, offering
no quantitative or qualitative yardstick for measuring this abstract ‘honesty’
concept.
Rather,
the case will be made that corruption in India is not rooted in any
national ‘dishonest’ trait, but
rather that it came about as a result of the post-independence socialist state,
which was accompanied by a lack of adequate ‘watchdog’ mechanisms. The state’s
active intervention in the economy meant that large bureaucratic departments
had to be established to deal with licensing, regulation and contracting –
departments which Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari lambasted as the
‘licence-permit-Raj,’ arguing that these all-powerful departments facilitated
the siphoning-off of funds into individuals’ pockets. While many reforms have
taken place to this day, this laid the seeds for corruption at the highest
levels which has persisted to this day.
Government
health agencies will be the specific focus here as a case study. A Transparency
International survey undertaken in 2002 revealed that public sector hospitals
were collectively responsible for 28% of corruption in India[vi].
The 2003 Central Government Health Scheme scam, which only came to light in
2003, demonstrated how, through the procurement of fictitious health services,
often for fictitious patients, officials were able to claim excessive
reimbursement for their own personal financial gain. The corruption was blatant
and appalling; Narayn points out that ‘M.R.I. scans were often supposedly given
to the same part of the same patient’s body within the same day.[vii]’
The fact that it took so long for such practices to be exposed reinforces the
earlier-made point that this corruption is rooted in the inadequacy of watchdog
bodies, rather than in any inherently ‘dishonest’ characteristic of the Indian
people.
Corruption
in India also extends directly to the governing institutions and Members of
Parliament. In April 2011, a former Indian National Congress Party MP and chief
of the Commonwealth Games Organizing Committee named Suresh Kalmadi was
arrested, and is being prosecuted on charges of ‘cheating, conspiracy and
corruption’ for awarding illegal contracts to a Swiss firm for a
Timing-Scoring-Result system for the Commonwealth Games, costing the exchequer
Rs 95 crore.[viii] Such corruption in the contracting
process, and in the ‘transaction costs’ for products exported from India, ‘adds
anywhere up to 25% of the cost[ix]’
of Indian exports. With such corruption at the highest levels, and without
adequate reform of the watchdog institutions to provide necessary transparency
and accountability, Indian development will be somewhat hamstrung.
Fragility in Indian coalition-building and governing
There is nothing necessarily inherent in coalition governments which
means they must be, or always are, weak or unstable per se. Germany is seldom
governed by one party holding a legislative majority, with coalition having
become the ‘status quo’, yet it is a major global economic and political power.
Similarly, there is nothing inherently weak about federal governments with
devolved powers. The United States, of course, has a federal governing system,
with each individual states having separate representative chambers and
law-making powers.
However,
very few countries combine such a significant devolvement of power with
coalitions involving so many different parties with different ideologies as
India does. This certainly was not always the case. India prior to 1967
experienced an ‘era of one-party rule[x]’,
as the India National Congress Party won the majority of seats in government
successively since independence. Yet, today the picture is drastically
different, where ‘a single-party does not seem possible any longer; a
combination of parties will continue to rule at the Centre.[xi]’
Indeed, there has been no single-party majority since 1989, and the United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) currently in power is made up of thirteen different
member parties, with at least five other parties who irregularly align with the
UPA.
Former
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee argued that ‘a national coalition government at
the centre will…steer the country and its system back to health.[xii]’
However, this appears to be a hopelessly optimistic and naïve assessment of the
reality of coalition politics, or ‘samanvay’. There should be no doubt
that Indian political parties have proven extraordinarily flexible in an
ideological sense, in order to accommodate various other political parties in a
coalition. Yet, there are still very often major disputes, which, if escalated,
threaten not only the survival of the coalition but also its ability to
effectively govern or respond to a crisis. The United Progressive Alliance,
which is dominated by the Indian National Congress Party, provides many such
examples of tensions. Tensions with the All India Trinamool Congress Party have
boiled over in recent months, with the Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar of the
Trinamool Congress Party denouncing the Food Security Act of Sonia Gandhi, the
chair of the UPA, as an ‘extravagant populist proposal.[xiii]’
A government attempt to address corruption through the Lokpal Bill, an attempt
to better scrutinize officials, is also being held back due to division within
the UPA. While the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DKM) believe the Prime Minister
should also come under the ambit of the scrutinizing body[xiv],
the Congress Party disagree. As a result, the Monsoon legislative period was
pushed back a month. Such inertia, as a result of coalition government, could
be a factor in impeding India’s development beyond the 2010s.
Another
factor which has caused the weakening of the central Indian government is the
‘regionalization’ of Indian politics. This could certainly be viewed as a
positive development – it prevents over-centralization of power, and gives each
individual region a louder voice, whereas they had been somewhat marginalized
previously under the majority rule of the Indian National Congress Party. It
has been argued that ‘no single party on its own is capable of ruling a country
as diverse as India[xv]’,
and this being the case, regionalization of politics is a necessary and
positive development. Mayawati Kumari, Chief Minister of India’s most populous
state Uttar Pradesh, is an example of a regional politician with enormous sway
on a national stage, and is known
widely as ‘Iron Lady[xvi]’
for the power she wields. Thus, the various regional governments in India are
highly powerful.
Yet, Sanghvi argues that ‘in
the formation of coalition governments, it is the regionalists…who have become
decisive because they have numbers.[xvii]’
Alternatively phrased, the disproportionate influence that the smaller regional
parties enjoy is undemocratic, since the larger pan-India parties need their
votes to sustain a majority government. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, a Tamil
party from Tamil Nadu, enjoys ‘a disproportionate share of powerful ministries.[xviii]’
Indeed, despite holding just 3% of seats in the Lok Sabha and 2.8% of seats in
the Rajya Sabha, it rules two key Cabinet ministries; Shipping, and Chemicals[xix].
Thus, this provides evidence to suggest that the arguably undemocratic nature
of some key elements of India’s coalition governments, made so by the
disproportionate influence the regional parties enjoy, could prove a stumbling
block for the future ability of Indian governments to respond effectively to
political challenges, or to effectively meet the demands of civil society, as
will now be discussed.
Gandhi’s legacy – passionate social activism
Modern-day India was forged in the midst of a fervent campaign against
the British Empire, and the Indian people won what was once seen as an
impossible victory against a major superpower in gaining their independence. As
such, it should be no surprise at all to onlookers that India has developed a
rich vein of social activism, holding the state and big businesses to account
through the medium of protest and people power. Lak argues that ‘India’s great
tradition of social and political activism probably began with Mohandas Gandhi[xx]’,
and there can be no denying the impact of Gandhi on modern-day India. Through
the concept of satyagraha, or peaceful protest, Gandhi was able to overthrow
the British Empire, inspiring and involving Indian citizens from all social
strata. The 1930 Great Salt Marsh, where Gandhi and 80,000 other Indians were
arrested for peacefully disobeying Britain’s claim to having a monopoly on the
collection of salt and merely collecting it themselves, thus evading taxes, was
one such example.
Anna
Hazare is perhaps the best known Indian social activist of modern times, having
cultivated both a domestic and international following in his fight against
corruption, that impediment to development mentioned previously in this essay.
It is hard not to draw between comparisons between Hazare and Mohandas Gandhi,
with Thakur describing how ‘his [Hazare’s] small frail body has taken several
blows from the countless agitations, tours and hunger strikes he has undertaken
since he came in public life in 1975.[xxi]’
In August 2011, Hazare was arrested by Delhi police ahead of a public fast that
was due to begin that same day, which in itself sparked a whole series of new
protests. While the methods and even P.R. of Hazare’s social activism is very
similar in itself to that of Gandhi, one could argue that the violent ends
suggested by Hazare are not particularly consistent with Gandhian satyagraha,
having previously suggested that ‘politicians…who caused the loss of thousands
of crores to the nation should be hanged.[xxii]’ However, it would certainly be
difficult to argue firstly that he was not inspired by Gandhi, and secondly
that his and others social activism is not a vital element in making India the
successful power that it is today, and will be beyond the 2010s.
Social
activism goes well beyond Anna Hazare, however, with the activism following the
Bhopal disaster highlighting the Indian people’s ability to organize on a mass
scale to take on a powerful opponent. When a poisonous gas leak took place in
December 1984 at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh,
up to 3,800 people were tragically killed. A wide range of advocacy groups have
established to lobby the Indian government and Dow Chemical, the company
responsible, for some form of redress, be that financial or a full clear-up of
the site. The Mahila Chetna Manch is an example of a group of women who came
together to campaign against this injustice. As Anderson points out, ‘their
demonstrations kept the issue of the settlement in the news while statements of
solidarity put pressure on both the Supreme Court and the Government to take
some form of action.[xxiii]’
While many to this day remain unhappy with the outcome and level of
compensation from Dow Chemical and Union Carbide, the new 1990 Indian
government decided that the quantum of settlement thus far provided was
insufficient to the needs of people in Bhopal, and the Supreme Court ruled in
December 1995 that the Indian government had a legal duty to provide relief to
the affected people of Bhopal. This further highlights the immeasurable value
of India’s uniquely strong tradition of social activism, which acts as a
counterweight to government and big business. This will continue to serve India
and the Indian people well beyond the 2010s.
A burgeoning and dynamic youthful population
India is one of the most youthful economic powers in the world today,
with around half of its 1.1 billion populace aged under 25 years old.[xxiv]
Some are very concerned about this; Meredith argues that ‘India faces a
population time bomb…if the nation fails to create jobs for its fast-growing
population of workers, it risks being mired in poverty and hopelessness.[xxv]’
To an extent this is true; for those Indians born into poverty, who are
unemployed, or who are subsistence farmers in the informal sector, there is a
significant possibility that a rapid population coupled with stagnation in the
jobs market might see the further entrenchment of economic inequality, and
continued drastic difference in standard of living and material wealth.
Yet,
those Indian children born into relative prosperity, of whom there are more and
more, are likely to act as a real catalyst for the Indian economy. This
argument cannot be made in isolation, and must rather be placed within a global
context. When India’s demographic situation is compared to that of other
nations around the world, it is clear why India stands to gain so substantially
from its increasingly ‘young’ population. In 2000, 10% of the world’s
population was over 60 years old. Yet, by 2050, this figure will have risen to
21.8%, much of this ageing stemming from current competitor states such as
China[xxvi],
where there will be significant issues with an ‘graying population’, straining
the welfare and tax systems, issues currently faced by the majority of Western
European states.
As
such, India will find itself in a unique position of comparative advantage with
regard to its youthful and economically active population. A young population
does not necessarily necessitate economic development; many sub-Saharan African
countries have incredibly youthful populations, yet remain trapped by endemic
poverty – the average Ethiopian citizen is just 18 years old, for example[xxvii].
Yet, while poverty also affects India, the average Indian worker is
significantly more productive than that of the vast majority of sub-Saharan
Africa states. Health issues such as HIV/AIDS are significantly more prevalent
in said African countries, affecting one’s ability to work and contribute to
the economy.
While the global ageing crisis
will eventually catch up with India too, Rajadhyaksha believes there is a
30-year period during which India will become the primary location
internationally for investment, summing up that ‘the gray-haired people on the
streets of Europe provide an opportunity for the restless and ambitious young
workers in countries like India.[xxviii]’
Thus, India’s youthful population may well be one of the critical comparative
advantages India holds in its progression beyond the 2010s. Rapid population
growth brings its own challenges, such as ensuring that there are jobs and
state provisions for all of these citizens. However, for those born into
comparative prosperity, there will be unprecedented employment opportunities,
accompanied by a probable wave of yet greater investment in India as a result
of the growing productive workforce, which may in turn even act as a catalyst
to increase opportunities for those marginalized groups.
Conclusion – challenged, but unperturbed
There can be no denying the significant issues India will face well into
the 21st century, and well beyond the 2010s. Corruption is common in
many practices in India, whether in truck drivers passing checkpoints, or even
getting a driving license. However, as previously mentioned, much more serious
is the often-endemic corruption at the very highest levels of the business and
political establishment, which damage India’s reputation internationally and
raise the cost of Indian exports, combining to India a less attractive prospect
for investors than it could be, and thus hampering its economic development.
India’s weak, regionalized, and often-divided Central government can result in
a state of inertia, with internal rifts within different factions of the
many-party governing coalitions negatively affecting the ability of the
government to meet the demands of the population and to rise to meet a certain
policy challenge. As mentioned earlier, the difficulty in establishing the
terms of the corruption Lokpal Bill is indicative.
Yet,
sheer strength of civil society in India will undoubtedly serve the nation well
in the future. India was forged in a political campaign of peace, and this
history guides the populace today. The countless examples when the Indian
people have come together to make their voices heard over an issue or certain
principle are crucial in holding government and big business to account.
Furthermore, India’s increasingly youthful population will continue to make it
an extremely attractively proposition for investors, with a highly productive
workforce. This is even more so when compared to the demographic issue of ‘ageing’
faced by Western Europe and China, and could well act as a significant catalyst
for India’s development beyond the 2010s.
[i] Sen, Kunal, ‘Why Did the Elephant Start to Trot?
India’s Growth Re-examined’, Economic and Political Weekly, (Manchester:
University of Manchester Press, 2007), p. 7
[ii] Narayan, Jayaprakash, ‘Organized Crime, Corruption and
Democracy’, from Basrur, Rajesh M., (ed.), ‘Challenges to Democracy in India’,
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 106
[iii] Ibid, p. 109
[iv] Vittal, N., ‘Corruption in India: the Roadblock to
National Prosperity’, (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2003), p. 30
[v] ‘Orientalism’, as defined by Edward Said, is broadly
the representation of the ‘East’, by the ‘West’, as comparatively backwards,
based on ill-founded stereotypes.
[vi] Mehta, S. S., ‘Corruption in India: An Empirical
Study’, Transparency International and ORG-MARG Research Pvt., Ltd., (Michigan:
University of Michigan, 2002), p. 19
[vii] Narayan, Jayaprakash, ‘Organized Crime, Corruption and
Democracy’, from Basrur, Rajesh M., (ed.), ‘Challenges to Democracy in India’,
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 109
[viii] Dutt, Barkha, (ed.), ‘CWG scam: Suresh Kalmadi
arrested, suspended by Congress’, NDTV, April 25, 2011, retrieved online
November 22, 2011,
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/suresh-kalmadi-arrested-formal-announcement-this-afternoon-101310
[ix] Vittal, N., ‘Corruption in India: the Roadblock to
National Prosperity’, (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2003), p. 44
[x] Jain, Sumitra Kumar, ‘Party Politics and Centre-State
Relations in India’, (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1994), p. 165
[xi] Chakrabaty, Bidyut, ‘Forging Power: Coalition Politics
in India’, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 202
[xii] Ibid, p. 236
[xiii] Jagannathan, R., (ed.), ‘UPA Should Be Renamed Divided
Regressive Alliance: Advani’, First Post, October 21, 2011, retrieved online,
November 25, 2011,
http://www.firstpost.com/fwire/upa-should-be-renamed-divided-regressive-alliance-advani-113469.html
[xiv] Dutt, Barkha, (ed.), ‘Lokpal Bill: Now UPA Allies
Divided’, NDTV, June 24, 2011, retrieved online, November 26, 2011,
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/lokpal-bill-now-upa-allies-divided-114418
[xv] Chakrabaty, Bidyut, ‘Forging Power: Coalition Politics
in India’, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 236
[xvi] Akhtar, Mohammed Jamil, ‘Iron lady, Kumari Mayawati’,
(New Delhi: Bahujan Sangathak, 1999), p. 23
[xvii] Sanghvi, Vir, ‘Neither Fair Nor Stable’, Hindustan
Times, March 24, 2007, retrieved online, November 28, 2011,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Neither-Fair-Nor-Stable/Article1-211739.aspx
[xviii] Linz, Juan J., Stepan, Alfed C., Yadav, Yogendra,
(eds.), ‘Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies’,
(Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 2011), p. 171
[xix] M.K. Azhagiri is Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers,
while G. K. Vasan is Minister of Shipping
[xx] Lak, Daniel, ‘India Express: the Future of the New
Superpower’, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 143
[xxi] Thakur, Pradeep, ‘Anna Hazare: The Face of India’s
Fight against Corruption’, (London: Pentagon Press, 2011), p. 121
[xxii] Bhagwat, Ramu, ‘Hang The Corrupt, says Anna Hazare:
Corruption Crusader Launches Fresh Campaign’, Times of India, March 16, 2011,
retrieved online November 28, 2011, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-16/nagpur/28698805_1_anti-corruption-crusader-gandhian-anna-hazare-corruption-issue
[xxiii] Anderson, Michael, ‘Litigation and Activism: The Bhopal
Case’, Third World Legal Studies, Vol. 1993, (New York: International Center
for Law Development, 1993), p. 183
[xxiv] Nilekani, Nandan, ‘Imagining India: the Idea of a
Renewed Nation’, (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), p. 53
[xxv] Meredith, Robyn, ‘The Elephant and the Dragon: The Rise
of India and China and What it Means for All of Us’, (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, Inc., 2008), p. 133
[xxvi] Lutz, Wolfgang, Sanderson, Warren, & Scherbov,
Sergei, ‘The Coming Acceleration of Global Population Ageing’, Nature, Vol. 451, (London: January, 2008), p. 716
[xxvii] Teller, Charles & Hailemariam, Assefa, ‘The
Demographic Transition and Development in Africa’ (New York: Springer
Dordrecht, 2011), p. 71
[xxviii] Rajadhyaksha, Niranjan, ‘The Rise of India: its
Transformation from Poverty to Prosperity’, (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons,
2007), p. 53
