Human Trafficking in the Balkans

Evaluate efforts to stop human trafficking in the Balkans

This essay will analyze, in the first instance, the wholly inadequate and poorly-coordinated efforts to combat human trafficking in the Balkans. In the next section, the case will be made that these policies have failed to adequately address the root causes of human trafficking in the region, and that national governments and supranational organizations have seldom taken a long-term perspective. In the final section of the essay, it will be argued that ‘human trafficking’, although a convenient catch-all pan-Balkans term, is not a particularly useful one, since it implies there are similarities in the root cause of the issue all over the region and indeed the world. Rather, the case will be made that ‘human trafficking’ in each geographical region is fundamentally different, and since modern-day human trafficking in the Balkans was essentially formed in the unique context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as such the solutions must equally be unique to adequately address the issue. Furthermore, a ‘blanket’ approach to the issue in the Balkans is unhelpful, as the very nature of the problem is different in each Balkan nation, with some predominantly a source for women, and others essentially ‘consumers,’ and with transit points constantly shifting and changing. However, common themes of an increasing focus on ‘human security’ (as opposed to traditional nation-state security) in various projects around the world to combat the issue can be considered a positive development, and transferable to the Balkans to a certain extent.

Post-Cold War attempts to stop human trafficking in the Balkans can be divided into two broad categories; the National Action Plans of the various national governments of the Balkans; and those efforts of international organizations and NGOs, essentially external actors. The point should be stressed at this stage that there is significant difference within each of these subcategories, but for our purposes it convenes to divide them as such so as treat prevention efforts as referent objects of analysis. Without doubt, the vast majority of attempts to combat the issue thus far have been unsuccessful. On first reading of the International Organization for Migration’s 2003 report on the state of human trafficking in the Balkans, one could be forgiven for proclaiming the incredible success of attempts to combat the issue. In Albania, for example, a miraculous 34% decline in the number of women recognized as having been trafficked was witnessed, with similar trends in Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina[1]. However, this belies the depressing truth – the attempts to combat human trafficking have so far only further entrenched it, pushing it further underground, making it harder to address. Recent estimates posit the number of women forced into prostitution by these organized crime networks in the Balkans as 200,000[2]. This problem remains criminally under-addressed, given its scope and severity.

The common state of affairs whereby national governments in the Balkan tend to withhold data on human trafficking, their over-focus on trafficking as a purely migratory or criminal issue, and half-hearted attempts at implementation, have fundamentally undermined the vast majority of National Action Plan legislative efforts. Take, for example, attempts in Romania, which is considered to be predominantly a source country for human trafficking in the Balkans[3]. Law 678/2001 was the first national effort to combat the problem, and subsequent similar laws have been passed in 2004 and 2009, with essentially similar remedies to the problem. The two major provisions are focused on retribution and justice; penalties for the traffickers can include ‘penalties from three to fifteen years’ imprisonment’, and ‘does not provide residence permits for victims of human trafficking.[4]’ Thus, the legislation fails to tackle two of they key root causes of the problem, which will be discussed in the next section of the essay – the ‘vicious cycle’ whereby those trafficked women who are deported and criminalized ‘are often met at the airport [in their country of origin] and returned to the sex trade,[5]’ upon being deported from the ‘consumer’ country. A more complex and nuanced approach, addressing the root cause rather than the surface-level symptom, is entirely lacking from the Romanian government’s attempt to tackle the problem. While the National Action Plans of various governments in the Balkans do differ to an extent, ‘the blurred intersection of sex trafficking and the treatment of prostitution is universal [among Balkan governments,][6]’ as is this over-focus on justice and criminalization, to the negligence of human security concerns and to the detriment of attempting to address the issue.

As the ‘oldest profession in the world[7]’, prostitution coupled with forced human trafficking of vulnerable women is certainly not a new problem, and accordingly combative efforts are not novel either. The first identifiable international attempt to address the practice of human trafficking stems back to 1904, under the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, which had an overt focus on ‘detecting and preventing the procuring of women or girls for immoral purposes abroad.[8]’ The remarkable relevance these words hold even today highlights the inherent similarities between the problem faced today and that of over a century ago. Yet, with globalization rapidly taking hold, the nature of the problem has shifted, and with it international legislation too. The cornerstone of international efforts to address human trafficking today is the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000, and in particular the Trafficking Protocol within that particular piece of legislation. The Convention was much-heralded, and has enjoyed wide acclamation, with Obokata claiming that it would ‘significantly facilitate global action against the [human trafficking] phenomenon in modern times.[9]’ However, this author accuses the Convention of having failed in its primary task of establishing a universally-accepted definition of the problem so as to facilitate coordination of policies trans-nationally, and also represents a missed opportunity to enshrine in international law some of they key provisions needed to address the root causes of the problem, which has had profoundly negative effects upon the Balkans. Article 3 of the Protocol defines human trafficking as:

‘…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, or fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.[10]’

However, as Friman and Reich have pointed out, ‘the Trafficking Protocol has not resolve disputes over how best to conceptualize human trafficking[11]’, with governments continuing to conflate the very different issues of forced labor and sexual exploitation. As such, harmonization of policy across state borders has been less successful than it could have been. Take, for example, Italy and the United Kingdom’s very different approaches regarding women trafficked from the Balkans and their legal status. Italy’s approach can be considered significantly more progressive, having ‘passed laws that protect the women and that give female victims the protection of potentially renewable six-month legal residency, even if they do not denounce their traffickers.[12]’ This is to recognize the aforementioned vicious-cycle, whereby punitive and immediate deportation can simply lead to re-entering this trafficking trade at source. The policy of the United Kingdom, contrastingly, is outdated and deeply inadequate, taking a simplistic stance in seeing the problem as a merely criminal one which can be addressed effectively though punishment. As Aranowitz points out, ‘British policy immediately deports women before they have given evidence against the trafficker.[13]’ As such, the Trafficking Protocol has failed to lead to policy harmonization across nation-state borders, through the failure to establish an accepted working definition of the issue.

In addition, the weak and non-obligatory clauses of the Convention represent mere lip-service to the underlying issues involved in human trafficking, particularly in the Balkans, rather than a desperately-needed concrete commitment. Article 6 and 7 provide pertinent examples of this; with the former providing that States ‘shall consider’ implementing measures for physical, psychological and social recovery for victims of trafficking[14]; the latter obliging states to merely ‘consider’ legal measures to allow victims to remain in their territories at least on a temporary basis[15]. As will now be explained, such measures should be vital elements of a strategy to address human trafficking in the Balkans, and the failure of international efforts to address the issue can be explained in large part by their failure to incorporate these ‘human security’ aspects.

What recommendations would you make to help end this illegal and immoral practice? Indicate programs that have worked in similar situations.

In this part, the recommendation will be made that attempts to combat human trafficking in the Balkans have failed to adequately address the root causes of the problem. As such, these root problems will be articulated, in conjunction with potential policies which, if implemented, could have a more significant impact.

Of course, a fundamental part of the attempt is to target the traffickers themselves, and harsh punishment and their lengthy imprisonment will always be a key part of reducing the human trafficking in the Balkans. However, there has been too much focus in the policies of both national governments in the Balkans and those international institutions upon the ‘target’ country, and inadequate focus upon the ‘source’ countries, and how to reduce the likelihood of trafficking coming about. An important caveat to make here is that women in the Balkans are not inherently more ‘naïve’ than any other human being in any other part of the world – while it may be very easy to just sympathise for these undoubtedly vulnerable girls, it would be wrong, Orientalist and contrary to the theme of empowerment to argue that there is anything inherently naïve about Bosnian women as opposed to American women.

There are broadly two different categories into which factors making human trafficking likely can be categorised; cultural factors; and economic factors. Here, Albania will be taken as a case study to discuss more effective ways to minimize human trafficking in the Balkans. As possibly the primary ‘source’ country for prostitutes in Western Europe trafficked from the Balkans, the outlook appears bleak for the ability to counter this issue in Albania. It is estimated that 50,000 Albanian women are currently sex slaves abroad, and make up around 70% of the trafficked women in London alone[16]. As will be argued, Albania presents an excellent opportunity to reassess the direction of policy to disrupt human trafficking, and fundamentally re-evaluate the approach taken, from a state-centric one to a more human-based security.

Cultural factors

Albania is a deeply male-dominated society, where although both genders are technically equal under the law, ‘traditional patriarchal customs continue to devalue women, especially in the rural areas.[17]’ Women are fundamentally disempowered, and as such obedience to men is taken as a given. The ties between this particular cultural feature of Albanian society and human trafficking is self-evident; if women are bound to obey men, then traffickers can very clearly abuse this to draw women into their criminal networks. The declining number of men as a result of mass emigration (discussed below) puts further onus on women finding a husband, and as LaCava and Nanetti point out, traffickers have learned to take advantage of this and ‘many young women are trapped into prostitution by men posing as boyfriends.[18]’ A further cultural factor which entrenches human trafficking, and leaves these women trapped in their new country, are the attitudes towards women who return from a life abroad as a prostitute, even if they had no choice whatsoever in this. As well as being positively ‘unmarriageable’, and having been subjected most likely to a range of sexually-transmitted infections, Albanian women ‘are too embarrassed to return and fear their families and communities will not accept them.[19]’ All of these factors further entrench human trafficking from a domestic point of view.

However, they certainly can and must be addressed. Some may regard intervening in Albanian society to promote supposedly ‘Western’ Englightenment ideals of equality as a form of ‘cultural imperialism[20]’, and that states like the U.S.A. and organizations like the U.N. have no business attempting to promote such ideals. Indeed, cultural beliefs run very deep, and perhaps it is wildly over-optimistic to the point of being hopelessly unrealistic to imagine that suddenly, Albanian society will value men and women entirely equally, in practice as well as in theory. However, this is unlikely, and this is where a long-term focus so very lacking from current attempts from national governments to address the issue of human trafficking.  The Women’s Center in Tirana, focus their attempts on changing attitudes and perceptions of women in these situations through education, and primarily of the next generation – predominantly middle- and high-school students. A high-profile campaigning drive in August 2009 involved the distribution of 3,000 leaflets around various schools in Tirana, and radio and television ‘infomercials’, to publicize the plight of these women, and how changing attitudes are desperately needed[21]. These efforts cannot be measured quantitatively in the sense that the number of arrested traffickers can – however, they are equally important. For its part, the global ‘West’ can play a role in funding these organizations, with the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs particularly crucial in providing financial support to the Women’s Center in this situation.

Economic factors

The Albanian economy faces ‘bleak prospects for the future…[and] is heavily reliant on donor aid and foreigners’ spending for significant proportions of its economic activity,[22]’ which can be attributed to the collapse of Yugoslavia, and the challenges Albania faced in modernizing its economy and selling previously state-owned assets. As mentioned previously, this prompted an ‘enormous wave of emigration in the early 1990s[23]’ from Albania, predominantly young men in search of employment Italy and Greece. In spite of this, the spectre of unemployment has continued to haunt Albania – while current estimates place national unemployment at around 13%, the figures change dramatically outside the capital of Tirana, where employment stands at 24%[24]. This situation is particularly conducive to forced trafficking, with women at this time ‘especially vulnerable to deceitful promises of a better life [abroad][25]’, often with the promise of restaurant employment which is quickly exposed upon arrival as a prostitution racket.

This being the case, attempts to combat human trafficking must also pay heed to the economic situation in these countries, and how high unemployment in particular can lead to higher rates of trafficking and enforced prostitution. The development arms of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Development Program, and of the U.S.A., such as the United States Agency for International Development, can play crucial roles in the alleviation of poverty and by extension reduce human trafficking, if combined with threats of heavy punishment and lengthy imprisonment for the traffickers themselves. Of particular importance, argue Territo and Kirkham, are projects which focus specifically on ‘[encouraging] women to start small businesses, including providing them with micro credit loans with low interest for a long period of time.[26]’ Both the Albanian government and international organizations have made encouraging tentative steps to this end. The government’s National Referral Mechanism provided micro-credit loans in 2009 to eleven women who were previously trafficked as prostitutes into Western Europe, and UNDP has held several lectures and seminars on business administration and management to access loans throughout Albania, for example in the town of Fier in May 2004[27]. Such schemes, in conjunction with a range of other policy tools, can help to make returning home safer for these trafficked women who manage to escape, and reduce the possibility of their being trafficked in the first instance.

Thus, international and national attempts to combat human trafficking in the Balkans have failed to largely address the issue at source. While prosecuting the traffickers themselves will always be a key cornerstone of action to rid the Balkans of this despicable practice, it must be combined with a strategy that focuses on reducing the number of vulnerable women in each target state. This would represent a much-needed shift in the foreign policy of the majority of actors in the theater of 21^st century world politics; to shift from addressing the security of the state, through these retributive measures, to a focus on human security, through enhancing protection on an individual level, and empowerment of women in these respective societies. Albania represents a typical case of a ‘source’ country for these trafficked women. While the ‘West’ must be wary of cultural imperialism, the U.N. and other such organizations can play a role in changing societal attitudes towards women, and take a long-term approach through education of the youth, rather than seeking quantitative increases in the number of arrested traffickers.

The particular sub-question here regarding successful programs in ‘similar situations’ is framed in an unhelpful way, and promotes a ‘universalist’ approach to combating human trafficking, i.e. to assume that the nature of the problem is the same, or similar, around the world. Consistent with the aforementioned points regarding the cultural and economic factors which facilitate the trafficking of Balkan women to other countries to live a degrading life of forced prostitution and modern-day slavery, there is only a limited amount that successful schemes in other parts of the world can contribute to addressing the problem in the Balkans. There can be no truly ‘similar situations’ to human trafficking in the Balkans.

For example, one could point to the example of Australia, and the success that country has enjoyed in reducing the number of trafficked women in recent years. This has largely been achieved through the 2003 Commonwealth Action Plan to Eradicate Trafficking in Persons, which among other elements, included strategies to ‘develop a reintegration project for trafficking victims who are returned to key source countries in Southeast Asia’, and ‘comprehensive victim support measures provided through…appropriate accommodation and living expenses and access for victims to a wide range of social support, legal, medical and counselling services.[28]’ However, this human trafficking bears little resemblance to the situation in the Balkans. For a start, the problem is of a much smaller scale; 1,000 women trafficked into Australia each year pales in comparison to the estimates of around 200,000 in and from the Balkans[29]. Furthermore, Australia faces merely an influx of trafficked women; many Balkan states are at once a source, a point of transit, and a final destination for these women. As such, the nature of the problem is very different. Thus, only a limited amount can be drawn from successful schemes in different regions, where the root causes of human trafficking are completely at odds with that of any another region. However, even if the precise preventative mechanisms here may not be of direct relevance to the Balkans, the aforementioned ‘human-based security’ concept which is evident here in the policy of assistance to those victims, rather than their speedy deportation, should be a crucial aspect of future policy to halt human trafficking and forced prostitution in the Balkans.

Conclusion

To conclude, both the UN Protocol and the majority of National Action Plans led by governments of various Balkan countries have failed to address the issue of human trafficking. While it would be naive to expect an immediate ‘policy fix’, since the root of the problem is to an extent grounded in, and compounded by, the patriarchal societal nature of many societies in the Balkans – Albania was used as a case study in this essay – the very focus of the majority of legislative efforts so far has been misguided. An over-focus on justice, and the hasty deportation of the victims of trafficking, can even serve to further the ‘vicious cycle’ effect, and entirely neglects the near-inevitability that returning the victims to their countries of origins can lead to their re-absorption into the trade, or even their death. Attempts to address the cultural and economic factors that entrench the problem could prove to be the most effective way to address the issue of human trafficking in the Balkans, and such attempts remain, for the moment, relatively nascent, with inconsistent application in the region.

---

[1] Counter-Trafficking Regional Clearing Point, ‘First Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South Eastern Europe’, (Vienna: International Organization for Migration, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, International Catholic Migration Commission, September 2003)

[2] Thacuk, Kimberley L., ‘Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs and Human Life’, (Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007), p. 81

[3] Dragomirescu, Dan Alexandru, Necula, Carmen and Simion, Raluca, ‘Romania: Emerging Market For Trafficking? Clients and Trafficked Women in Romania’, from Di Nicola, Andrea (ed.), ‘Prostitution and Human Trafficking: Focus on Clients’, (New York: Springer Publishers, 2009), p. 124

[4] European Commission, ‘Fight Against Trafficking in Human Beings: Romania’, October 13, 2011, retrieved online December 4, 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/showNIPsection.action;jsessionid=1ptnNngN1Cvv8P4jGThj9Qy9j8dmY7QKZhWKWvSSMKQJYVh7f8v6!-403728570?sectionId=a9eb3934-22fa-4dc2-8977-40191d57e5bb

[5] Burrell, Barbara C., ‘Women and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook’(California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2002), p. 204

[6] Friman, H. Richard and Reich, Simon, ‘Human Trafficking, Human Security, and the Balkans’, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), p. 10

[7] Matthews, Roger, ‘Prostitution, Politics and Policy’, (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008), p. 22

[8] Friman, H. Richard and Reich, Simon, ‘Human Trafficking, Human Security, and the Balkans’, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), p. 5

[9] Obokata, Tom, ‘Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective: Towards a Holistic Approach’, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), p. 164

[10] United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, Article 3, Section (a), retrieved online December 9, 2011, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf

[11] Friman, H. Richard and Reich, Simon, ‘Human Trafficking, Human Security, and the Balkans’, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), p. 8

[12] Boudreaux, Richard, ‘Journey Into Sex Slavery’, Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2010, retrieved online December 7, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/17/news/mn-35129

[13] Aronowitz, Alexis A., ‘Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: The Phenomenon, The Markets that Drive It and the Organisations that Promote It’, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 9, No. 2, Fall/Winter 2001, p. 173

[14] United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, Article 6, retrieved online December 9, 2011, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf

[15] United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, Article 7, retrieved online December 9, 2011, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf

[16] Vickers, Miranda and Pettifer, James, ‘The Albanian Question: Reshaping the Balkans’, (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2007), p. 129

[17] Territo, Leonard and Kirkham, George, ‘International Sex Trafficking of Women and Children: Understanding the Global Epidemic’, (New York: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., 2010), p. 115

[18] LaCava, Gloria and Nanetti, Raffaelle, ‘Albania: Filling the Vulnerability Gap’, World Bank Technical Paper No. 480, (Washington, DC: 2000), p. 63

[19] Territo, Leonard and Kirkham, George, ‘International Sex Trafficking of Women and Children: Understanding the Global Epidemic’, (New York: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., 2010), p. 116

[20] Phillips, Anne, ‘Gender and Culture’, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 14

[21] Territo, Leonard and Kirkham, George, ‘International Sex Trafficking of Women and Children: Understanding the Global Epidemic’, (New York: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., 2010), p. 118

[22] Tarifa, Fatos, ‘To Albania, With Love’, (Maryland: Hamilton Books, 2007), p. 26

[23] Zimmerman, Klaus F. And Kahanec, Martin, ‘EU Labor Markets After Post-Enlargement Migration’, (New York: Springer Publishers, 2010), p. 321

[24] Rashid, Mansoora, ‘Household Welfare, The Labor Market, and Social Programs in Albania’, World Bank Technical Paper No. 503, (Washington DC: 2001), p. 22

[25] Van Hook, Mary P., ‘Sexual Trafficking of Women: Tragic Proportions and Attempted Solutions in Albania’, International Social Work, Vol. 49, No. 1, (January, 2006), p. 32

[26] Territo, Leonard and Kirkham, George, ‘International Sex Trafficking of Women and Children: Understanding the Global Epidemic’, (New York: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., 2010), p. 120

[27] Mistry, Natasha, ‘Empowering Citizens for Change’, United Nations Volunteers, October 4, 2004, retrieved online, December 9, 2011, http://www.unv.org/en/what-we-do/countries/albania/doc/empowering-citizens-for-change.html

[28] Murray, John, ‘The Role of Community Policing in Trafficking in Women and Children in Australia’, from Ebbe, Obi N. & Das, Dilip K., (eds.), ‘Global Trafficking in Women and Children’, (Florida: CRC Press, 2008), p. 215

[29] Ibid, p. 210

North Korea, China, and World War III

North Korea is often described as 'pariah state', or even as the 'hermit kingdom.' Indeed, its people live a 'sheltered' life, in the sense that almost all external influences are mediated and banished by the D.P.R.K. state. Kim Jong-il, preceded by his father Kim il-Sung and potentially succeeded by son Kim Jong-un, is often portrayed as the 'crazy dictator', with exotic tastes in fine liquors and cinema, his finger supposedly poised over the nuclear button.

However, Kim Jong-il is not the 'madman' portrayed by the Western media, and in fact is a very skilled identity entrepreneur. In spite of all predictions of the collapse of the North Korean war, particularly since drastic reductions in Russian aid following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea has survived.

The pervasive cult of personality surrounding Kim il-Sung related to his days as a revolutionary soldier, sent to fight in China to support Communist Mao' Zedong's battle against the Nationalists led by Chang Kai-Shek (who went on to form the Taipei government).

However, Kim Jong-il had no such glorious military past, and as such, a 'void' existed in how exactly to engender support (the extent to which this is consent or coercion is unknown) from the masses arose.

'Juche' arose. This is the ideological glue that now binds together the entirety of North Korea. Derived from Confucian philosophy, Juche broadly means a 'self-reliance', or that North Korea (occupied for much of its history) is proudly independent, and needs no great power to support it.

This, in reality, could not be further from the truth. North Korea is hugely dependent on China, which makes up 73% of the foreign trade, 90% of the oil, 80% of the consumer goods, and 45% of the food which North Korea consumes.

Kim Jong-il's reign is less secure than many believe. His loosening grip on the exchange of information, brought about by black market radio, TVs and phones from China, means North Koreans are increasingly able to access outside information - indeed, South Korean soaps are becoming increasing popular. It is thus no longer possible to keep up the pretence that the North enjoys a superior standard of living; the wealth and luxury enjoyed in Seoul contrasts with the omnipresent threat of famine in Pyongyang.

As such, North Korea's deepening dependence on China is increasingly exposed. Unsurprisingly, this troubles Kim Jong-il, already unnerved by developments taking place over which he has decreasing influence, and takes every opportunity possible to distance himself from China (which Beijing understands, and permits to an extent).

The shelling of the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong in late November 2010 is a prime example of this. It could be argued that this attack had very little to do with Seoul and South Korea, and much more to do with the external population of North Korea. Determined to show his subjects North Korea's independence from China, the 'Great Leader' opened fire upon this tiny island, with South Korea promising that any future aggression from the North will lead to a response from Seoul.

However, another attack is inevitable. As Kim's grip over the population weakens, he will be increasingly likely to act aggressively on the international stage to reinforce the image of juche, or North Korean independence.

North Korea arguably holds more influence over China than any other nation in the world. The collapse of the North Korean would have devastating consequences for China, and as such Beijing is willing to accept North Korean belligerence, and wields its veto in the United Nations Security Council to prevent anti-D.P.R.K. resolutions and statements being passed.

The first reason Beijing fears the fall of Kim Jong-il is that, invariably, South Korea would be focused on rebuilding civil society and basic infrastructure in the North after any potential collapse. As such, South Korean Foreign Direct Investment (F.D.I.) in China would drop significantly, and would have undesirable economic consequences for China, particularly in its acquisition of foreign currencies.

Secondly, there would be demographic consequences for China if North Korea collapsed. China's overpopulation issue is nothing new; the one-child policy has been in effect for many decades. As such, an influx of refugees over the North Korean border would create significant population issues for China, upsetting a finely-poised population-balancing act.

China, deeply mistrustful of U.S. ally Japan, firstly for atrocities committed during the World War II at Nanjing for which Tokyo has never acknowledged guilt, and secondly for Japanese and American thinly-veiled support for Taiwanese independence from China, is unlikely to support Western policy toward North Korea anytime soon unless there is a drastic rapprochement with Japan.

A South Korean response to the next attack from Pyongyang is highly likely, and it is anybody's guess just how far this escalation will lead - will the U.S. live up to its treaty commitments and support the South militarily? If it does, we could be watching the beginnings of a major international crisis, particularly given the presence of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

The Role of the Press in Establishing International Law : Gaddafi

Scenes of jubilant parading Libyans, firing their weapons into the sky, filled our TV screens and newspaper front pages yesterday, when it was announced that Muammar Gaddafi had been killed by Libyan forces 'loyal to the new regime.'

The images of Gaddafi's downfall were bloody (yes, literally). The fashion in which Gaddafi was killed was brutal; having been discovered and subsequently captured, he appears to have begged for his life before receiving a fatal bullet to the temple.

Upon seeing the pictures, my housemate exclaimed, 'this is terrible! The more people see these pictures, the more people will feel sympathy for Gaddafi - the press shouldn't release them.'

And feel sympathy they should.

Make no mistake, Gaddafi was an absolutist dictator who committed horrific mass atrocities against his own population, ruling with an iron fist. The empowered Libyan people rose up to overthrow him, and there is no doubt that by October 20, 2011, Gaddafi had long ago lost all legitimacy, or right to represent the Libyan people.

However, executing him on the spot without any criminal trial was a travesty and an affront to our commitment to justice and the rule of law. It was most feeble of Prime Minister David Cameron to argue that 'it is a matter for the new authorities in Libya to do what they believe is right with Gaddafi,' effectively passing the buck.

Can those who were personally and directly subjected to Gaddafi's iron fist really be expected to react in an objective, emotion-less way, taking the long-term consequences into account, upon capturing him? Yesterday's needless brutality, motivated by a $1 million bounty on the head of Gaddafi, appears to suggest that they cannot.

A court case is the only way to truly determine the extent of Gaddafi's personal responsibility, and to punish him accordingly. This option also provides a vehicle for the Libyan people to express their grievances, and is a crucial part of the healing process.

The Libyan legal system, previously controlled by Gaddafi, would have been completely inadequate in attempting to conduct such a trial. The Libyan National Transitional Council have been hard at work establishing a new legal system, but as Geoffrey Robertson points out, the court would be 'plainly unable to secure an unbiased legal process when he does fall into its hands.'

Gaddafi should have faced trial at the International Criminal Court, where an objective sentence would have been handed out, and a free, fair and unbiased court case could have been undertaken, much as it was for Radovan Karadzic.

Human rights abuses may, on some basic level, persist forever. Some may even argue such tendencies are grounded in human nature (though I would fervently disagree). However, we can minimize such events through the establishment of international legal norms, and to empower an institution with the mandate to prosecute suspected individuals. More importantly, their threat to bring said individual(s) to court must be credible, in order to temper the behaviour of human rights abusers for fear of punishment.

The only way to make this threat credible is to establish precedent. We cannot continue the age-old practice of Western powers removing one head of state, followed by fervent finger-crossing that his or her predecessor will simply 'behave better', accompanied by piecemeal and wholly reversible domestic structural reforms.

The world missed out on an incredible opportunity when a bullet was dispatched to the temple of Muammar Gaddafi yesterday. The press has a responsibility to showcase the images around the world - their shocking nature will hopefully make people think again about the wisdom of this 'shoot first, ask questions later' policy.

McIdentity : The Deficiency of Neo-Realism

Security and identity are two concepts that deeply intertwined on many different levels, and cannot be separated. Not all scholars would agree with this point of view, however. The dominant neo-realist paradigm ignores the role of identity in security; this approach will be analysed first, and largely dismissed. Subsequently, social constructivist arguments about the intersubjectively constructed nature of ‘identity’ will be considered, and defended from reification criticisms. The Copenhagen School process of securitising a threat to identity will then be critically analysed, before looking at the various ways identities can be defended or secured from said threats. The crucial role of ‘identity’ in Azar’s ‘protracted social conflicts’ will be examined as a case study of the relationship between identity and security. The essay will conclude that security and identity produce each other, and cannot be separated.

Neorealism dominated late twentieth century International Relations. One of the key theoretical assumptions of neorealism is that all states are unitary. States seek survival, and therefore ‘all states, whether democratic or totalitarian, exhibit competitive behaviour.[1]’ The interests of states are accordingly uniform; the objective need to survive is universal. According to neorealists, the relationship between identity and security is minimal for this reason. However, this identity-security relationship is deeply flawed on many levels. Momentarily leaving aside the misguided state-centricism of neorealism, the idea that interests are objective is also false. One actor may obviously prioritise certain issues above another on the basis of their identity. For example, France appears to be significantly more interested in regime change in Libya than the Maldives is, which contrastingly prioritises reversing the effects of climate change. Their interests, and by extension agendas and actions, are entirely different. This is because rather than objectively occurring, ‘interest follows from identity,[2]’ and identity determines the logic of appropriateness.

But what is ‘identity’, and how does it come about? The increasingly popular field of social constructivism attempts to answer this question. Identity does not exist objectively; rather, it is intersubjectively constructed, as are all other social facts. Social facts like ‘identity’ do not exist in any objective sense like a mountain does, but rather come about because we have created them. Essentially, expectations about the ‘self’ come from the perception of ‘self’ that is cemented by said actor, but also by the ‘other’ – ‘every identity needs an ‘other’ against which it is set.[3]’. These identities are complex, and can be constructed over significant periods of time. Germany has developed a ‘pacifist identity[4]’, potentially as a result of the infamous Holocaust period under the dictator Adolf Hitler. This identity was shown in Germany and Chancellor Schroeder’s ‘strong public rejection[5]’ of Tony Blair and George W. Bush’s mission to oust Saddam Hussein from office in Iraq in 2003. Identity and security are henceforth inseparable; the identity of an actor affects, and even entirely guides, all attempts to make ‘something’ secure.

The Copenhagen School introduced the concept of ‘securitisation’, which makes explicit the relationship between identity and security. While previous theories focused mainly on states, Copenhagen School theorists introduced the idea of ‘societal security.’ While this can relate to the security of national identity, it is more often invoked with regard to sub-sectional groups or identities within the state, such as an ethnic group like the Tutsis in Rwanda, or a religious group like the Islamic Uighurs in China. Societal security relates to ‘the sustainable development of traditional patterns of language, culture, religious and identities and customs of societies.[6]’ It was the aforementioned process of ‘securitisation’, however, which investigates how security threats to said societal identities are constructed. Securitisation is ‘a more extreme version of politicisation,[7]’ in that a securitising actor identifies a threat to the identity in question, and ‘asserts that it has to adopt extraordinary means that go beyond the ordinary norms of the political domain [to nullify the threat].’[8]’ Therefore, the relationship between identity and security is a very close one; identity necessitates security.

The argument that the constructivist notion of ‘identity’ is based on reification can be dismissed. McSweeney argues that the Copenhagen School treats ‘identity’ as an objective reality, claiming rather that ‘identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation.[9]’ Identity is supposedly so fluid that it cannot reliably be the referent object of security, or a unit of analysis. However, this is a fundamental misreading of social constructivism. Copenhagen School theorists argue that social facts (such as ‘identity’), while intersubjectively constructed and ‘re-mouldable’ at any point in time, remain relatively ‘sticky.’ As Theiler outlines, ‘when beliefs and institutions become deeply sedimented, they change only very slowly.[10]’ The Masai tribue of Kenya and Tanzania, for example, is unlikely to imminently disappear as an identity, having existed in some form since the late 17^th century[11]. Therefore, this criticism that the notion of ‘identity’ is a reification can be dismissed.

Buzan has developed a five-dimensional approach to societal security[12], and threats to identity can come from each of these spheres. They include military identity threats (e.g. Hutu extermination of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994); political (e.g. in Sri Lanka, Sinhalese exclusion of the Tamil minority); cultural and economic (e.g. globalisation eroding traditional cultures around the world – McDonald’s restaurants in 119 nation states[13]); and environmental threats to identity (e.g. Amerindian tribes’ identity threatened by the rapid Amazonian deforestation.) He also looks at horizontal competition, where influence from a neighbouring identity threatens another identity, and vertical competition, where institutions like the EU, which widen and homogenise identity. In each of these instances, a securitising actor has identified and politicised a perceived ‘threat’ to the very existence of each of these identities. Identity and security are inseparable here – neorealism fails to take into account the role of identity in creating interests and, by extension, securitising actions.

The responses to ‘secure’ or protect a threatened identity also prove the links between identity and security, and such responses can be broadly divided into military responses and non-military responses. Military responses are self-explanatory, and involve a society defending its threatened identity through the use of force. This is ‘particularly the case if identity is linked to territory[14]’, and the most evident example here is the Palestinians, who feel their identity and homeland is threatened by the expansionist Israeli state, using military tactics to attempt to defend their identity. Hamas and their military wing the Al-Qassam Brigades use such military methods to defend Palestinian identity[15].

However, military responses are often impossible for some identity groups, due to insufficient resources to mount a successful military challenge, or perhaps because the threat to the identity is non-military. Waever advocates ‘defending culture with culture, and consequently, culture becomes security policy.[16]’ Threats to culture must be met with projects of ‘cultural nationalism[17]’ to strengthen that very cultural identity which is threatened. The French anti-globalisation movement, unofficially led by José Bové, seeks to oppose the erosion of ‘traditional French farmer culture’, which is perceived to be threatened by the forces of globalisation. Whether this is a real threat is unimportant – a securitised threat to the intersubjectively constructed French farmer identity ‘exists’ subjectively here. Identity and security are thus mutually reinforcing.

Another significant branch of non-military response to securitised identity threats involve ethno-political nationalism. This involves a society, usually within a pre-existing state, although possibly transcending state borders, whose identity is felt to be threatened to the point that secession must be attained for survival. Somaliland, a now semi-autonomous region of Somalia, provides an example of this. The former President Siad Barre committed massacres against the Somaliland people in 1988[18], leading to the securitisation of such a threat by regional leaders, and finally a drive for independence. Somaliland identity has evolved from Somali national identity, and while the region lacks official sovereignty recognition, it is de facto autonomous. This indicates that identity and security are inseparable; one cannot begin to talk about security without talking about the identity which is being secured, and vice versa.

Edward Azar’s conceptualisation of ‘Protracted Social Conflicts’ (PSC) highlights the inseparability of identity and security, in stark contrast to the outdated neorealist tradition. PSC can be defined as ‘hostile interactions between communal groups that are based in deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural hatreds, and that persist over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence.[19]’ These conflicts occur within states – however, one identity community can clash with the state in attempts to attain security. Lebanon is an example of a state that is engaged in PSC. The (Christian) Maronites who migrated to Lebanon considered the Muslim inhabitants to be ‘religiously and culturally alien.[20]’ The Maronites securitised the persecuting threat to their identity supposedly posed by the Muslims, which included a policy of forced religious conversion[21]. In 1860, the Maronites felt persecuted to the extent that they attempted to seize power, which led to their massacre by the Muslims. To this day, PSC continues between the religious groups in Lebanon, and the Maronites continue to feel that their identity is threatened by Muslims. Security is thus needed to defend identity – the two concepts are deeply intertwined, and Maronite security cannot be explained without taking into account the subjective role of Maronite identity.

To conclude, security and identity are not only related, but mutually reinforce each other to a significant extent. Without security, identity cannot exist, and vice versa. Identity groups securitise threats to their survival, and respond as best they can to nullify that security threat, whether by military, cultural or political means. Neorealism is fatally flawed in its refusal to accept the role of intersubjectively constructed identities as the precursor to interests, and in its narrow focus upon states. While identities are intersubjectively constructed and can emerge or disappear over time, they remain relatively fixed entities, and are thus an essential referent object for security.

---

[1] Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 321

[2] Karin M. Fierke, ‘Critical Approaches to International Security’, (Cambridge: Polity Press Ltd., 2007), p. 80

[3] Jill Steans & Lloyd Pettiford, ‘Introduction to International Relations’, (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), p. 195

[4] Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement’, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 13

[5] Dieter Dettke, ‘Germany Says “No”: The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy’, (The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), p. 166

[6] Barry Buzan, ‘People States and Fear’, (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 122-3

[7] Jaap de Wilde, Ole Waever & Barry Buzan, ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 23

[8] Ralf Emmers, ‘Securitisation’, from Alan Collins (ed.), ‘Contemporary Security Studies’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 139

[9] Bill McSweeney, ‘Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations’, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 82

[10] Tobias Theiler, ‘Societal Security and Social Pscyhology’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 29, Issue 02, (Cambridge: Cambridge Journals, 2003), p. 254

[11] Lisa McQuall, ‘The Masai of Africa’, (Minneapolis: Lerner Publications, 2002), p. 5

[12] Barry Buzan, ‘People States and Fear’, (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 121

[13] Jing Han, ‘The Business Strategy of McDonald’s’, International Journal of Business and Management, Vol. 3, No. 11, (Canadian Centre of Science and Education, Nov. 2008), p. 73

[14] Paul Roe, ‘Societal Security’, from Alan Collins (ed.), ‘Contemporary Security Studies’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 210

[15] Wendy Kristianasen, ‘Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas’s Response to Oslo’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3, (California: University of California Press, Spring 1999), p. 25

[16] Ole Waever, ‘Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe’, (Pinter, 1993), p. 91

[17] John Hutchinson, ‘Modern Nationalism’, (London: Fontana Press, 1994), p. 18

[18] I. M. Lewis, ‘Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society’, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 95

[19] Ronald J. Fisher, ‘Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasee’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 3, (Spring 2001), p. 308

[20] Elizabeth Crighton & Martha Abele Mac Iver, ‘The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict: Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Northern Ireland and Lebanon’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 2, (New York: City University of New York Press, Jan., 1991), p. 128

[21] Illiya Harik, ‘The Maronite Church and Political Change in Lebanon’, from Leonard Binder, (ed.), ‘Politics in Lebanon’, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 19-20