The Responsibility to Protect's irresponsible failure: Why international humanitarian law means human rights abuses can continue unabashed

Introduction

The Responsibility to Protect represents a very new idea within the field of world politics, having first gained international prominence in the early 2000s. This essay will offer an in-depth analysis of the Responsibility to Protect report released by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Firstly, the main principles of the doctrine will be briefly outlined, before moving on to a critical investigation into those principles. The argument will be made that R2P is a far less revolutionary concept than its authors might portray it to be, and it disappointingly fails to make significant headway in addressing the obstacles blocking the path to facilitating humanitarian intervention in clear cases of human rights abuses. The failure to address the conflict between humanitarian law and human rights law in the international system will be addressed first, before moving on to discuss how R2P does not represent a radical shift from nation-state security to human security. Finally, it will be argued that R2P essentially skims the pressing issue of greatly-needed Security Council reform, and its proposed reliance on a Security Council with veto-wielding permanent members means that the same inconsistent application of humanitarian intervention laws would continue under the R2P framework.

The key tenets

Before moving onto analyze the strengths and failings of the R2P doctrine, it is essential to clearly establish the key guiding tenets of the framework. The very most fundamental point made in R2P is that state sovereignty is conditional upon the nation-state addressing its duty to respect the human rights of its citizens: ‘where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.[1]’ When this occurs, other states have a responsibility to take action; the ICISS describes three lines of responsibility. Firstly, the responsibility to prevent; secondly, the responsibility to react; and thirdly, the responsibility to rebuild. The document also presents, based on the principles of Just War, several criteria by which to establish whether or not intervention is warranted in a particular situation, attempting to address the ambiguity in Chapter VII of the UN Charter over what exactly constitutes a ‘threat to the peace.’ A critical discussion of some of the mechanisms outlined in the report follows.

Reproduces the same legal contradictions

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), although noble in its quest to resolve the sovereignty versus intervention debate by changing the discursive parameters, can be considered a failure. Its explicit aim is to move towards resolving the ‘sovereignty versus intervention debate’ by changing the discursive parameters at play. However, the Report is full of contradictions and assertions that serve to merely reproduce the same legal issues of the ‘sovereignty versus intervention’ debate. It makes no progress in solving the legal debate, and focuses merely on ‘legitimacy.’

Banakar argues that R2P is a ‘revolutionary development[2]’ in the sovereignty-intervention legal debate. His argument is based on the Report’s assertion that ‘sovereignty implies a dual responsibility; externally to respect the sovereignty of states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all people within the state.[3]’ Subscribing to the R2P doctrine, Teson argues that ‘sovereignty derives from a state’s responsibility to protect its citizens, and when a state fails in its duty, it loses its sovereign rights.[4]’ This is intended to address the contradiction in the U.N. Charter between Article 2.7, which ‘prohibits the United Nations itself from interfering in the domestic affairs of its member states’, and Chapter VII, which permits such interference so as to nullify a ‘threat to the peace’ via a Security Council Resolution.

As such, when the Security Council is unable to pass a resolution as in the case of Syria (see above: O’Bryan, Tom, ‘Security Council & Military Intervention’), a state of impasse and inaction develops, with no action being taken to resolve the issue. Teital argues this is due to the fundamental legal tension currently at play in the international system, whereby the statist model of law based on borders and nationality is ‘now giving way to alternative view of the meaning of global order…The merger between humanitarian law and human rights gives rise to a complicated and somewhat contradictory legal regime that challenges the very basis of…the international rule of law.[5]’

There is a clear basis to intervene in Syria under the Just Law criteria (humanitarian law) laid out in the R2P report, where there is undeniable ‘large scale loss of life…which is the product of deliberate state action.[6]’ States are thus obliged to intervene, breaking the inviolability of Syria’s sovereignty, to ensure that the human rights of the Syrian citizens are protected consistent with the U.N. Convention on Human Rights. However, since intervention under R2P is still dependent on a United Nations Security Council Resolution, it is highly feasible that a situation identical to the present impasse on Syria could happen again. Although clearer to establish what constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 2.7 in the abstract, R2P does not address the conflict playing out in the Security Council between humanitarian law and human rights conflict. As such, R2P is not any more likely to better protect human rights. The weakness in relying on the Security Council will be discussed at greater depth in a later stage of this essay.

Human security remains marginalized by national security

The Responsibility to Protect framework also entrenches the current focus on nation state security, as opposed to human security. While the human rights of individuals are the concern of R2P, they are posited within the conceptual framework of nation-states. Under R2P, states remain the only ‘subjects’ of international law; the U.N. Charter speaks to the rights of ‘states’, and while R2P does focus on individuals, it is only within the context of nation-states. As such, individuals are marginalized from the international humanitarian legal process, even though they are the victim of human rights abuses under human rights law. Under R2P, it is still only nation-states who have the ability to bring a resolution legitimizing intervention with the purpose of protecting human rights to the Security Council. As Meurant argues, ‘each state has a locus standi to protect against violations of the [human rights] Conventions and to demand their cessation.[7]’

Citizens who are having their human rights abused are largely reliant on an external third-party state, under the principle of erga omnes, taking up the cause of these abuses in the United Nations. This is one of the fundamental reasons why nation-states could still face impunity for human rights abuses under R2P. The international legal system, crafted in a context of inter-nation war, has failed to adapt to the modern-day context of intra-state war. States are conceived of as the ‘victims’ of inter-state war, and logically the international legal system therefore gives nation-states the ability to redress their grievances through bring their case to the United Nations.

Contrastingly, those citizens who are the ‘victims’, as defined by R2P, of violence by the state are completely marginalized from the international legal process and are unable to bring their grievance to the ultimate arbiter of interventions; the United Nations Security Council. For example, while Kuwait was able to bring up Iraq’s illegal invasion of its territory in 1990, the Syrian people have no course to raise the human rights abuses being committed against them by Bashar al-Assad.

Furthermore, the states who usually exercise the prerogative to raise concern about ‘human rights’ are typically those of the ‘West.’ Falk criticizes the hypocrisy of states ‘preaching’ about human rights in other countries when such abuses do occur in those Western countries themselves: ‘the West feels the emphasis is on human rights as an instrument of foreign policy, not as a corrective to domestic shortcomings…this self-righteous diplomacy is producing a new crusader mentality that underpins the advocacy of humanitarian intervention.[8]’ For example, it is not inconceivable that the citizens of countries where the United States of America condemns human rights abuses resent this supposedly ‘arrogant’ stance from a country committing human rights violations in Guantanamo Bay, and invading civil liberties with the PARTIOT Act. While states, rather than the victimized people themselves, are the only body with the legal authority to relay their concerns in the Security Council and submit a resolution, then the entire legitimacy of intervention could be undermined – particularly if those states are not shining beacons of human rights themselves.

Until this fundamental inequality in international law is addressed, there is little to prevent continued human rights abuses. The Responsibility to Protect framework does very little to change the focus of international law from nation-state security to human security.

Failure to address the flawed Security Council

The most fundamental flaw of the Reponsibility to Protect report is its inadequate response to the issue of the inconsistency of Security Council Resolutions mandating humanitarian interventions. As has been established in the previous essay (see above: O’Bryan, Tom, ‘Security Council & Military Intervention’), the Security Council’s decision-making is inherently political thanks to the veto-wielding power of the Permanent 5. If intervention is opposed by one of the P5, then human rights abuses will continue. R2P still accepts that the Security Council is the crucial arbiter for humanitarian intervention, with Bellamy pointing out that ‘R2P insists that the buck stops with the UN Security Council,[9]’ with Thaukar and Weiss concurring, saying that ‘Security Council authorization forms the core of the responsibility to protect.[10]’

This is only problematic due to the nature of the veto powers of the Permanent 5, which is one of the primary obstacles to establishing an objective decision-making basis regarding intervention. As such, one would expect addressing this issue to be front and center at the mind of the ICISS. However, the solution offered appears to be hopelessly optimistic. The R2P report offers the following remedy to the problem of arbitrary use of the veto: ‘the permanent five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.[11]’

The first problem with this is that the very definition of ‘vital state interests’ is highly ambiguous, debatably of equal ambiguity as the operative clause of Chapter VII of ‘threat to the peace’, as such reproducing the very same problems of ambiguity all over again and resolving very little. Secondly, as already outlined, this is for the moment a hopelessly optimistic solution. As Roberts points out, ‘the Security Council members have shown no enthusiasm for tying themselves to the ICISS’s proposed wording or anything like it.[12]’ This is highly problematic, and without resolving this issue, the R2P framework essentially reproduces the same fundamental problems of politicization, selectivity and inconsistency in interventions in the Security Council. Without a resolution of this issue, the entirety of the other solutions offered by the ICISS effectively lose their value.

Conclusion

The Responsibility to Protect represents a much-needed drive to change the structure of international affairs so as to remove the obstacles currently blocking an objective and clear basis from which interventions could be justified. However, R2P fails completely to this end. The same ambiguities of terminology, legal contradictions, and political obstacles inherent in the U.N. Charter are reproduced in the R2P report although alternatively phrased. Until human beings become subjects under international law, and there is fundamental reform of the Security Council and the veto power of the P5, then humanitarian interventions will unfortunately remain the politicized and inconsistently-applied phenomena they are today regardless of the ICISS’s best efforts to the contrary.

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[1] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), p. xi

[2] Banakar, Reza, ‘Rights in Context: Law and Justice in Late Modern Society’, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), p. 268

[3] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), p. 8

[4] Teson, F. R., ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’, from Holzgrefe, J. L. & Owen, Robert (eds.), ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas’, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 93

[5] Teitel, Ruti G., ‘Transitional Justice’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 362

[6] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), p. 14

[7] Meurant, Jacques, ‘Inter Arma Caritas: Evolution and Nature of International Humanitarian Law’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 24, No. 3, (Sage Puglications, 1987), p. 246

[8] Falk, Richard A., ‘Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World’, (New York: Routledge Publishers, 2000), p. 91

[9] Bellamy, ‘Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: Words to Deeds’, (New York: Routledge Publishers, 2011), p. 162

[10] Thakur, Ramesh & Weiss, Thomas G., ‘Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey’, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 321

[11] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), p. 9

[12] Roberts, Sir Adam, ‘The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention’, from Welsh, Jennifer (ed.), ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 145

India: Looking Beyond the 2010s

“The elephant has started to trot.” - Kunal Sen

Introduction

India, long seen as the ‘elephant economy’, in other words economically powerful but slow to transform, has seen dramatic change over the past ten years, and will continue to do so into the near future, as this research paper will discuss. Indeed, Kunal Sen recently symbolically announced that ‘the elephant has started to trot.[i]’ This essay will argue very broadly that India’s strength, and thus route to future success, lies in its society. The uniquely strong tradition of social activism is one of the major reasons why Indian democracy has succeeded where other post-colonial democratic states did not, and the sheer number of young people will continue to act as a catalyst for India’s meteoric development well beyond the 2010s. However, there are still serious impediments to India’s growth, and the case will be made that these impediments reside largely within the ruling governmental and business institutions. Corruption, although manifest at many levels within society, can be crippling at the governmental level. In addition, the very nature of Indian coalitions has also often hampered development – a unique political development in Westminster-style former British colonies. An important caveat to draw here is that, of course, India faces a wide range of both challenges and holds innumerable strengths, and on some occasions it may be difficult to determine whether one particular aspect is detrimental or beneficial. Rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive explanation or prediction regarding India’s growth, this paper merely attempts to shed light on some of the key contemporary issue that arise on a daily basis in 21^st century India. A conclusion will be drawn that India

Elite corruption in India – persistent, pervasive and potent

The first impediment to India, looking beyond the 2010s, is corruption. This issue has become a prominent issue on the Indian news agenda, largely thanks to social activist Anna Hazare, who will be examined in greater depth later in this essay. Corruption is also certainly not a recent development, not just in India but all over the world. In India, there is ‘phenomenal, all-pervasive corruption eating into the vitals of the system.[ii]’ This includes petty corruption; it is estimated that a typical truck driver in India pays around Rs 200 every day at check posts and octroi centers[iii]. Ultimately, however, it is not this corruption which will hold back India’s development. Of course, on an individual-level, corruption means that certain individuals may not be able to pay these illicit levies or charges, to the detriment of social equality. But, it is the institutional corruption within large enterprise or even the Indian government that has the potential to significantly affect the pace and depth of India’s development.

            Vittal argues, with reference to India, that ‘nations where people are habitually more honest, and less corrupt, will tend to get more investment, trade and business.[iv]’ This argument is highly problematic. The first error it makes is equating levels of ‘honesty’ with levels of corruption, inferring that some peoples, perhaps Westerners, are simply more ‘honest’ than others (perhaps the so-called ‘Third World’) thus supposedly explaining the comparative development of the ‘civilized’ West. The statement seems to imply that the reason for corruption in India is something habitually dishonest about the Indian people, a both essentialist and Orientalist[v] statement. Furthermore, it is fatally flawed in itself as a concept, offering no quantitative or qualitative yardstick for measuring this abstract ‘honesty’ concept.

            Rather, the case will be made that corruption in India is not rooted in any national  ‘dishonest’ trait, but rather that it came about as a result of the post-independence socialist state, which was accompanied by a lack of adequate ‘watchdog’ mechanisms. The state’s active intervention in the economy meant that large bureaucratic departments had to be established to deal with licensing, regulation and contracting – departments which Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari lambasted as the ‘licence-permit-Raj,’ arguing that these all-powerful departments facilitated the siphoning-off of funds into individuals’ pockets. While many reforms have taken place to this day, this laid the seeds for corruption at the highest levels which has persisted to this day.

            Government health agencies will be the specific focus here as a case study. A Transparency International survey undertaken in 2002 revealed that public sector hospitals were collectively responsible for 28% of corruption in India[vi]. The 2003 Central Government Health Scheme scam, which only came to light in 2003, demonstrated how, through the procurement of fictitious health services, often for fictitious patients, officials were able to claim excessive reimbursement for their own personal financial gain. The corruption was blatant and appalling; Narayn points out that ‘M.R.I. scans were often supposedly given to the same part of the same patient’s body within the same day.[vii]’ The fact that it took so long for such practices to be exposed reinforces the earlier-made point that this corruption is rooted in the inadequacy of watchdog bodies, rather than in any inherently ‘dishonest’ characteristic of the Indian people.

            Corruption in India also extends directly to the governing institutions and Members of Parliament. In April 2011, a former Indian National Congress Party MP and chief of the Commonwealth Games Organizing Committee named Suresh Kalmadi was arrested, and is being prosecuted on charges of ‘cheating, conspiracy and corruption’ for awarding illegal contracts to a Swiss firm for a Timing-Scoring-Result system for the Commonwealth Games, costing the exchequer Rs 95 crore.[viii]  Such corruption in the contracting process, and in the ‘transaction costs’ for products exported from India, ‘adds anywhere up to 25% of the cost[ix]’ of Indian exports. With such corruption at the highest levels, and without adequate reform of the watchdog institutions to provide necessary transparency and accountability, Indian development will be somewhat hamstrung.

Fragility in Indian coalition-building and governing

There is nothing necessarily inherent in coalition governments which means they must be, or always are, weak or unstable per se. Germany is seldom governed by one party holding a legislative majority, with coalition having become the ‘status quo’, yet it is a major global economic and political power. Similarly, there is nothing inherently weak about federal governments with devolved powers. The United States, of course, has a federal governing system, with each individual states having separate representative chambers and law-making powers.

            However, very few countries combine such a significant devolvement of power with coalitions involving so many different parties with different ideologies as India does. This certainly was not always the case. India prior to 1967 experienced an ‘era of one-party rule[x]’, as the India National Congress Party won the majority of seats in government successively since independence. Yet, today the picture is drastically different, where ‘a single-party does not seem possible any longer; a combination of parties will continue to rule at the Centre.[xi]’ Indeed, there has been no single-party majority since 1989, and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) currently in power is made up of thirteen different member parties, with at least five other parties who irregularly align with the UPA.

            Former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee argued that ‘a national coalition government at the centre will…steer the country and its system back to health.[xii]’ However, this appears to be a hopelessly optimistic and naïve assessment of the reality of coalition politics, or ‘samanvay’. There should be no doubt that Indian political parties have proven extraordinarily flexible in an ideological sense, in order to accommodate various other political parties in a coalition. Yet, there are still very often major disputes, which, if escalated, threaten not only the survival of the coalition but also its ability to effectively govern or respond to a crisis. The United Progressive Alliance, which is dominated by the Indian National Congress Party, provides many such examples of tensions. Tensions with the All India Trinamool Congress Party have boiled over in recent months, with the Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar of the Trinamool Congress Party denouncing the Food Security Act of Sonia Gandhi, the chair of the UPA, as an ‘extravagant populist proposal.[xiii]’ A government attempt to address corruption through the Lokpal Bill, an attempt to better scrutinize officials, is also being held back due to division within the UPA. While the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DKM) believe the Prime Minister should also come under the ambit of the scrutinizing body[xiv], the Congress Party disagree. As a result, the Monsoon legislative period was pushed back a month. Such inertia, as a result of coalition government, could be a factor in impeding India’s development beyond the 2010s.

            Another factor which has caused the weakening of the central Indian government is the ‘regionalization’ of Indian politics. This could certainly be viewed as a positive development – it prevents over-centralization of power, and gives each individual region a louder voice, whereas they had been somewhat marginalized previously under the majority rule of the Indian National Congress Party. It has been argued that ‘no single party on its own is capable of ruling a country as diverse as India[xv]’, and this being the case, regionalization of politics is a necessary and positive development. Mayawati Kumari, Chief Minister of India’s most populous state Uttar Pradesh, is an example of a regional politician with enormous sway on a national stage,  and is known widely as ‘Iron Lady[xvi]’ for the power she wields. Thus, the various regional governments in India are highly powerful.

Yet, Sanghvi argues that ‘in the formation of coalition governments, it is the regionalists…who have become decisive because they have numbers.[xvii]’ Alternatively phrased, the disproportionate influence that the smaller regional parties enjoy is undemocratic, since the larger pan-India parties need their votes to sustain a majority government. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, a Tamil party from Tamil Nadu, enjoys ‘a disproportionate share of powerful ministries.[xviii]’ Indeed, despite holding just 3% of seats in the Lok Sabha and 2.8% of seats in the Rajya Sabha, it rules two key Cabinet ministries; Shipping, and Chemicals[xix]. Thus, this provides evidence to suggest that the arguably undemocratic nature of some key elements of India’s coalition governments, made so by the disproportionate influence the regional parties enjoy, could prove a stumbling block for the future ability of Indian governments to respond effectively to political challenges, or to effectively meet the demands of civil society, as will now be discussed.

Gandhi’s legacy – passionate social activism

Modern-day India was forged in the midst of a fervent campaign against the British Empire, and the Indian people won what was once seen as an impossible victory against a major superpower in gaining their independence. As such, it should be no surprise at all to onlookers that India has developed a rich vein of social activism, holding the state and big businesses to account through the medium of protest and people power. Lak argues that ‘India’s great tradition of social and political activism probably began with Mohandas Gandhi[xx]’, and there can be no denying the impact of Gandhi on modern-day India. Through the concept of satyagraha, or peaceful protest, Gandhi was able to overthrow the British Empire, inspiring and involving Indian citizens from all social strata. The 1930 Great Salt Marsh, where Gandhi and 80,000 other Indians were arrested for peacefully disobeying Britain’s claim to having a monopoly on the collection of salt and merely collecting it themselves, thus evading taxes, was one such example.

            Anna Hazare is perhaps the best known Indian social activist of modern times, having cultivated both a domestic and international following in his fight against corruption, that impediment to development mentioned previously in this essay. It is hard not to draw between comparisons between Hazare and Mohandas Gandhi, with Thakur describing how ‘his [Hazare’s] small frail body has taken several blows from the countless agitations, tours and hunger strikes he has undertaken since he came in public life in 1975.[xxi]’ In August 2011, Hazare was arrested by Delhi police ahead of a public fast that was due to begin that same day, which in itself sparked a whole series of new protests. While the methods and even P.R. of Hazare’s social activism is very similar in itself to that of Gandhi, one could argue that the violent ends suggested by Hazare are not particularly consistent with Gandhian satyagraha, having previously suggested that ‘politicians…who caused the loss of thousands of crores to the nation should be hanged.[xxii]’  However, it would certainly be difficult to argue firstly that he was not inspired by Gandhi, and secondly that his and others social activism is not a vital element in making India the successful power that it is today, and will be beyond the 2010s.

            Social activism goes well beyond Anna Hazare, however, with the activism following the Bhopal disaster highlighting the Indian people’s ability to organize on a mass scale to take on a powerful opponent. When a poisonous gas leak took place in December 1984 at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, up to 3,800 people were tragically killed. A wide range of advocacy groups have established to lobby the Indian government and Dow Chemical, the company responsible, for some form of redress, be that financial or a full clear-up of the site. The Mahila Chetna Manch is an example of a group of women who came together to campaign against this injustice. As Anderson points out, ‘their demonstrations kept the issue of the settlement in the news while statements of solidarity put pressure on both the Supreme Court and the Government to take some form of action.[xxiii]’ While many to this day remain unhappy with the outcome and level of compensation from Dow Chemical and Union Carbide, the new 1990 Indian government decided that the quantum of settlement thus far provided was insufficient to the needs of people in Bhopal, and the Supreme Court ruled in December 1995 that the Indian government had a legal duty to provide relief to the affected people of Bhopal. This further highlights the immeasurable value of India’s uniquely strong tradition of social activism, which acts as a counterweight to government and big business. This will continue to serve India and the Indian people well beyond the 2010s.

A burgeoning and dynamic youthful population

India is one of the most youthful economic powers in the world today, with around half of its 1.1 billion populace aged under 25 years old.[xxiv] Some are very concerned about this; Meredith argues that ‘India faces a population time bomb…if the nation fails to create jobs for its fast-growing population of workers, it risks being mired in poverty and hopelessness.[xxv]’ To an extent this is true; for those Indians born into poverty, who are unemployed, or who are subsistence farmers in the informal sector, there is a significant possibility that a rapid population coupled with stagnation in the jobs market might see the further entrenchment of economic inequality, and continued drastic difference in standard of living and material wealth.

            Yet, those Indian children born into relative prosperity, of whom there are more and more, are likely to act as a real catalyst for the Indian economy. This argument cannot be made in isolation, and must rather be placed within a global context. When India’s demographic situation is compared to that of other nations around the world, it is clear why India stands to gain so substantially from its increasingly ‘young’ population. In 2000, 10% of the world’s population was over 60 years old. Yet, by 2050, this figure will have risen to 21.8%, much of this ageing stemming from current competitor states such as China[xxvi], where there will be significant issues with an ‘graying population’, straining the welfare and tax systems, issues currently faced by the majority of Western European states.

            As such, India will find itself in a unique position of comparative advantage with regard to its youthful and economically active population. A young population does not necessarily necessitate economic development; many sub-Saharan African countries have incredibly youthful populations, yet remain trapped by endemic poverty – the average Ethiopian citizen is just 18 years old, for example[xxvii]. Yet, while poverty also affects India, the average Indian worker is significantly more productive than that of the vast majority of sub-Saharan Africa states. Health issues such as HIV/AIDS are significantly more prevalent in said African countries, affecting one’s ability to work and contribute to the economy.

While the global ageing crisis will eventually catch up with India too, Rajadhyaksha believes there is a 30-year period during which India will become the primary location internationally for investment, summing up that ‘the gray-haired people on the streets of Europe provide an opportunity for the restless and ambitious young workers in countries like India.[xxviii]’ Thus, India’s youthful population may well be one of the critical comparative advantages India holds in its progression beyond the 2010s. Rapid population growth brings its own challenges, such as ensuring that there are jobs and state provisions for all of these citizens. However, for those born into comparative prosperity, there will be unprecedented employment opportunities, accompanied by a probable wave of yet greater investment in India as a result of the growing productive workforce, which may in turn even act as a catalyst to increase opportunities for those marginalized groups.

Conclusion – challenged, but unperturbed

There can be no denying the significant issues India will face well into the 21^st century, and well beyond the 2010s. Corruption is common in many practices in India, whether in truck drivers passing checkpoints, or even getting a driving license. However, as previously mentioned, much more serious is the often-endemic corruption at the very highest levels of the business and political establishment, which damage India’s reputation internationally and raise the cost of Indian exports, combining to India a less attractive prospect for investors than it could be, and thus hampering its economic development. India’s weak, regionalized, and often-divided Central government can result in a state of inertia, with internal rifts within different factions of the many-party governing coalitions negatively affecting the ability of the government to meet the demands of the population and to rise to meet a certain policy challenge. As mentioned earlier, the difficulty in establishing the terms of the corruption Lokpal Bill is indicative.

            Yet, sheer strength of civil society in India will undoubtedly serve the nation well in the future. India was forged in a political campaign of peace, and this history guides the populace today. The countless examples when the Indian people have come together to make their voices heard over an issue or certain principle are crucial in holding government and big business to account. Furthermore, India’s increasingly youthful population will continue to make it an extremely attractively proposition for investors, with a highly productive workforce. This is even more so when compared to the demographic issue of ‘ageing’ faced by Western Europe and China, and could well act as a significant catalyst for India’s development beyond the 2010s.

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[i] Sen, Kunal, ‘Why Did the Elephant Start to Trot? India’s Growth Re-examined’, Economic and Political Weekly, (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2007), p. 7

[ii] Narayan, Jayaprakash, ‘Organized Crime, Corruption and Democracy’, from Basrur, Rajesh M., (ed.), ‘Challenges to Democracy in India’, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 106

[iii] Ibid, p. 109

[iv] Vittal, N., ‘Corruption in India: the Roadblock to National Prosperity’, (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2003), p. 30

[v] ‘Orientalism’, as defined by Edward Said, is broadly the representation of the ‘East’, by the ‘West’, as comparatively backwards, based on ill-founded stereotypes.

[vi] Mehta, S. S., ‘Corruption in India: An Empirical Study’, Transparency International and ORG-MARG Research Pvt., Ltd., (Michigan: University of Michigan, 2002), p. 19

[vii] Narayan, Jayaprakash, ‘Organized Crime, Corruption and Democracy’, from Basrur, Rajesh M., (ed.), ‘Challenges to Democracy in India’, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 109

[viii] Dutt, Barkha, (ed.), ‘CWG scam: Suresh Kalmadi arrested, suspended by Congress’, NDTV, April 25, 2011, retrieved online November 22, 2011, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/suresh-kalmadi-arrested-formal-announcement-this-afternoon-101310

[ix] Vittal, N., ‘Corruption in India: the Roadblock to National Prosperity’, (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2003), p. 44

[x] Jain, Sumitra Kumar, ‘Party Politics and Centre-State Relations in India’, (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1994), p. 165

[xi] Chakrabaty, Bidyut, ‘Forging Power: Coalition Politics in India’, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 202

[xii] Ibid, p. 236

[xiii] Jagannathan, R., (ed.), ‘UPA Should Be Renamed Divided Regressive Alliance: Advani’, First Post, October 21, 2011, retrieved online, November 25, 2011, http://www.firstpost.com/fwire/upa-should-be-renamed-divided-regressive-alliance-advani-113469.html

[xiv] Dutt, Barkha, (ed.), ‘Lokpal Bill: Now UPA Allies Divided’, NDTV, June 24, 2011, retrieved online, November 26, 2011, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/lokpal-bill-now-upa-allies-divided-114418

[xv] Chakrabaty, Bidyut, ‘Forging Power: Coalition Politics in India’, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 236

[xvi] Akhtar, Mohammed Jamil, ‘Iron lady, Kumari Mayawati’, (New Delhi: Bahujan Sangathak, 1999), p. 23

[xvii] Sanghvi, Vir, ‘Neither Fair Nor Stable’, Hindustan Times, March 24, 2007, retrieved online, November 28, 2011, http://www.hindustantimes.com/Neither-Fair-Nor-Stable/Article1-211739.aspx

[xviii] Linz, Juan J., Stepan, Alfed C., Yadav, Yogendra, (eds.), ‘Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies’, (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 2011), p. 171

[xix] M.K. Azhagiri is Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers, while G. K. Vasan is Minister of Shipping

[xx] Lak, Daniel, ‘India Express: the Future of the New Superpower’, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 143

[xxi] Thakur, Pradeep, ‘Anna Hazare: The Face of India’s Fight against Corruption’, (London: Pentagon Press, 2011), p. 121

[xxii] Bhagwat, Ramu, ‘Hang The Corrupt, says Anna Hazare: Corruption Crusader Launches Fresh Campaign’, Times of India, March 16, 2011, retrieved online November 28, 2011, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-16/nagpur/28698805_1_anti-corruption-crusader-gandhian-anna-hazare-corruption-issue

[xxiii] Anderson, Michael, ‘Litigation and Activism: The Bhopal Case’, Third World Legal Studies, Vol. 1993, (New York: International Center for Law Development, 1993), p. 183

[xxiv] Nilekani, Nandan, ‘Imagining India: the Idea of a Renewed Nation’, (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), p. 53

[xxv] Meredith, Robyn, ‘The Elephant and the Dragon: The Rise of India and China and What it Means for All of Us’, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2008), p. 133

[xxvi] Lutz, Wolfgang, Sanderson, Warren, & Scherbov, Sergei, ‘The Coming Acceleration of Global Population Ageing’, Nature, Vol. 451, (London: January, 2008), p. 716

[xxvii] Teller, Charles & Hailemariam, Assefa, ‘The Demographic Transition and Development in Africa’ (New York: Springer Dordrecht, 2011), p. 71

[xxviii] Rajadhyaksha, Niranjan, ‘The Rise of India: its Transformation from Poverty to Prosperity’, (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), p. 53

Human Trafficking in the Balkans

Evaluate efforts to stop human trafficking in the Balkans

This essay will analyze, in the first instance, the wholly inadequate and poorly-coordinated efforts to combat human trafficking in the Balkans. In the next section, the case will be made that these policies have failed to adequately address the root causes of human trafficking in the region, and that national governments and supranational organizations have seldom taken a long-term perspective. In the final section of the essay, it will be argued that ‘human trafficking’, although a convenient catch-all pan-Balkans term, is not a particularly useful one, since it implies there are similarities in the root cause of the issue all over the region and indeed the world. Rather, the case will be made that ‘human trafficking’ in each geographical region is fundamentally different, and since modern-day human trafficking in the Balkans was essentially formed in the unique context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as such the solutions must equally be unique to adequately address the issue. Furthermore, a ‘blanket’ approach to the issue in the Balkans is unhelpful, as the very nature of the problem is different in each Balkan nation, with some predominantly a source for women, and others essentially ‘consumers,’ and with transit points constantly shifting and changing. However, common themes of an increasing focus on ‘human security’ (as opposed to traditional nation-state security) in various projects around the world to combat the issue can be considered a positive development, and transferable to the Balkans to a certain extent.

Post-Cold War attempts to stop human trafficking in the Balkans can be divided into two broad categories; the National Action Plans of the various national governments of the Balkans; and those efforts of international organizations and NGOs, essentially external actors. The point should be stressed at this stage that there is significant difference within each of these subcategories, but for our purposes it convenes to divide them as such so as treat prevention efforts as referent objects of analysis. Without doubt, the vast majority of attempts to combat the issue thus far have been unsuccessful. On first reading of the International Organization for Migration’s 2003 report on the state of human trafficking in the Balkans, one could be forgiven for proclaiming the incredible success of attempts to combat the issue. In Albania, for example, a miraculous 34% decline in the number of women recognized as having been trafficked was witnessed, with similar trends in Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina[1]. However, this belies the depressing truth – the attempts to combat human trafficking have so far only further entrenched it, pushing it further underground, making it harder to address. Recent estimates posit the number of women forced into prostitution by these organized crime networks in the Balkans as 200,000[2]. This problem remains criminally under-addressed, given its scope and severity.

The common state of affairs whereby national governments in the Balkan tend to withhold data on human trafficking, their over-focus on trafficking as a purely migratory or criminal issue, and half-hearted attempts at implementation, have fundamentally undermined the vast majority of National Action Plan legislative efforts. Take, for example, attempts in Romania, which is considered to be predominantly a source country for human trafficking in the Balkans[3]. Law 678/2001 was the first national effort to combat the problem, and subsequent similar laws have been passed in 2004 and 2009, with essentially similar remedies to the problem. The two major provisions are focused on retribution and justice; penalties for the traffickers can include ‘penalties from three to fifteen years’ imprisonment’, and ‘does not provide residence permits for victims of human trafficking.[4]’ Thus, the legislation fails to tackle two of they key root causes of the problem, which will be discussed in the next section of the essay – the ‘vicious cycle’ whereby those trafficked women who are deported and criminalized ‘are often met at the airport [in their country of origin] and returned to the sex trade,[5]’ upon being deported from the ‘consumer’ country. A more complex and nuanced approach, addressing the root cause rather than the surface-level symptom, is entirely lacking from the Romanian government’s attempt to tackle the problem. While the National Action Plans of various governments in the Balkans do differ to an extent, ‘the blurred intersection of sex trafficking and the treatment of prostitution is universal [among Balkan governments,][6]’ as is this over-focus on justice and criminalization, to the negligence of human security concerns and to the detriment of attempting to address the issue.

As the ‘oldest profession in the world[7]’, prostitution coupled with forced human trafficking of vulnerable women is certainly not a new problem, and accordingly combative efforts are not novel either. The first identifiable international attempt to address the practice of human trafficking stems back to 1904, under the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, which had an overt focus on ‘detecting and preventing the procuring of women or girls for immoral purposes abroad.[8]’ The remarkable relevance these words hold even today highlights the inherent similarities between the problem faced today and that of over a century ago. Yet, with globalization rapidly taking hold, the nature of the problem has shifted, and with it international legislation too. The cornerstone of international efforts to address human trafficking today is the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000, and in particular the Trafficking Protocol within that particular piece of legislation. The Convention was much-heralded, and has enjoyed wide acclamation, with Obokata claiming that it would ‘significantly facilitate global action against the [human trafficking] phenomenon in modern times.[9]’ However, this author accuses the Convention of having failed in its primary task of establishing a universally-accepted definition of the problem so as to facilitate coordination of policies trans-nationally, and also represents a missed opportunity to enshrine in international law some of they key provisions needed to address the root causes of the problem, which has had profoundly negative effects upon the Balkans. Article 3 of the Protocol defines human trafficking as:

‘…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, or fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.[10]’

However, as Friman and Reich have pointed out, ‘the Trafficking Protocol has not resolve disputes over how best to conceptualize human trafficking[11]’, with governments continuing to conflate the very different issues of forced labor and sexual exploitation. As such, harmonization of policy across state borders has been less successful than it could have been. Take, for example, Italy and the United Kingdom’s very different approaches regarding women trafficked from the Balkans and their legal status. Italy’s approach can be considered significantly more progressive, having ‘passed laws that protect the women and that give female victims the protection of potentially renewable six-month legal residency, even if they do not denounce their traffickers.[12]’ This is to recognize the aforementioned vicious-cycle, whereby punitive and immediate deportation can simply lead to re-entering this trafficking trade at source. The policy of the United Kingdom, contrastingly, is outdated and deeply inadequate, taking a simplistic stance in seeing the problem as a merely criminal one which can be addressed effectively though punishment. As Aranowitz points out, ‘British policy immediately deports women before they have given evidence against the trafficker.[13]’ As such, the Trafficking Protocol has failed to lead to policy harmonization across nation-state borders, through the failure to establish an accepted working definition of the issue.

In addition, the weak and non-obligatory clauses of the Convention represent mere lip-service to the underlying issues involved in human trafficking, particularly in the Balkans, rather than a desperately-needed concrete commitment. Article 6 and 7 provide pertinent examples of this; with the former providing that States ‘shall consider’ implementing measures for physical, psychological and social recovery for victims of trafficking[14]; the latter obliging states to merely ‘consider’ legal measures to allow victims to remain in their territories at least on a temporary basis[15]. As will now be explained, such measures should be vital elements of a strategy to address human trafficking in the Balkans, and the failure of international efforts to address the issue can be explained in large part by their failure to incorporate these ‘human security’ aspects.

What recommendations would you make to help end this illegal and immoral practice? Indicate programs that have worked in similar situations.

In this part, the recommendation will be made that attempts to combat human trafficking in the Balkans have failed to adequately address the root causes of the problem. As such, these root problems will be articulated, in conjunction with potential policies which, if implemented, could have a more significant impact.

Of course, a fundamental part of the attempt is to target the traffickers themselves, and harsh punishment and their lengthy imprisonment will always be a key part of reducing the human trafficking in the Balkans. However, there has been too much focus in the policies of both national governments in the Balkans and those international institutions upon the ‘target’ country, and inadequate focus upon the ‘source’ countries, and how to reduce the likelihood of trafficking coming about. An important caveat to make here is that women in the Balkans are not inherently more ‘naïve’ than any other human being in any other part of the world – while it may be very easy to just sympathise for these undoubtedly vulnerable girls, it would be wrong, Orientalist and contrary to the theme of empowerment to argue that there is anything inherently naïve about Bosnian women as opposed to American women.

There are broadly two different categories into which factors making human trafficking likely can be categorised; cultural factors; and economic factors. Here, Albania will be taken as a case study to discuss more effective ways to minimize human trafficking in the Balkans. As possibly the primary ‘source’ country for prostitutes in Western Europe trafficked from the Balkans, the outlook appears bleak for the ability to counter this issue in Albania. It is estimated that 50,000 Albanian women are currently sex slaves abroad, and make up around 70% of the trafficked women in London alone[16]. As will be argued, Albania presents an excellent opportunity to reassess the direction of policy to disrupt human trafficking, and fundamentally re-evaluate the approach taken, from a state-centric one to a more human-based security.

Cultural factors

Albania is a deeply male-dominated society, where although both genders are technically equal under the law, ‘traditional patriarchal customs continue to devalue women, especially in the rural areas.[17]’ Women are fundamentally disempowered, and as such obedience to men is taken as a given. The ties between this particular cultural feature of Albanian society and human trafficking is self-evident; if women are bound to obey men, then traffickers can very clearly abuse this to draw women into their criminal networks. The declining number of men as a result of mass emigration (discussed below) puts further onus on women finding a husband, and as LaCava and Nanetti point out, traffickers have learned to take advantage of this and ‘many young women are trapped into prostitution by men posing as boyfriends.[18]’ A further cultural factor which entrenches human trafficking, and leaves these women trapped in their new country, are the attitudes towards women who return from a life abroad as a prostitute, even if they had no choice whatsoever in this. As well as being positively ‘unmarriageable’, and having been subjected most likely to a range of sexually-transmitted infections, Albanian women ‘are too embarrassed to return and fear their families and communities will not accept them.[19]’ All of these factors further entrench human trafficking from a domestic point of view.

However, they certainly can and must be addressed. Some may regard intervening in Albanian society to promote supposedly ‘Western’ Englightenment ideals of equality as a form of ‘cultural imperialism[20]’, and that states like the U.S.A. and organizations like the U.N. have no business attempting to promote such ideals. Indeed, cultural beliefs run very deep, and perhaps it is wildly over-optimistic to the point of being hopelessly unrealistic to imagine that suddenly, Albanian society will value men and women entirely equally, in practice as well as in theory. However, this is unlikely, and this is where a long-term focus so very lacking from current attempts from national governments to address the issue of human trafficking.  The Women’s Center in Tirana, focus their attempts on changing attitudes and perceptions of women in these situations through education, and primarily of the next generation – predominantly middle- and high-school students. A high-profile campaigning drive in August 2009 involved the distribution of 3,000 leaflets around various schools in Tirana, and radio and television ‘infomercials’, to publicize the plight of these women, and how changing attitudes are desperately needed[21]. These efforts cannot be measured quantitatively in the sense that the number of arrested traffickers can – however, they are equally important. For its part, the global ‘West’ can play a role in funding these organizations, with the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs particularly crucial in providing financial support to the Women’s Center in this situation.

Economic factors

The Albanian economy faces ‘bleak prospects for the future…[and] is heavily reliant on donor aid and foreigners’ spending for significant proportions of its economic activity,[22]’ which can be attributed to the collapse of Yugoslavia, and the challenges Albania faced in modernizing its economy and selling previously state-owned assets. As mentioned previously, this prompted an ‘enormous wave of emigration in the early 1990s[23]’ from Albania, predominantly young men in search of employment Italy and Greece. In spite of this, the spectre of unemployment has continued to haunt Albania – while current estimates place national unemployment at around 13%, the figures change dramatically outside the capital of Tirana, where employment stands at 24%[24]. This situation is particularly conducive to forced trafficking, with women at this time ‘especially vulnerable to deceitful promises of a better life [abroad][25]’, often with the promise of restaurant employment which is quickly exposed upon arrival as a prostitution racket.

This being the case, attempts to combat human trafficking must also pay heed to the economic situation in these countries, and how high unemployment in particular can lead to higher rates of trafficking and enforced prostitution. The development arms of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Development Program, and of the U.S.A., such as the United States Agency for International Development, can play crucial roles in the alleviation of poverty and by extension reduce human trafficking, if combined with threats of heavy punishment and lengthy imprisonment for the traffickers themselves. Of particular importance, argue Territo and Kirkham, are projects which focus specifically on ‘[encouraging] women to start small businesses, including providing them with micro credit loans with low interest for a long period of time.[26]’ Both the Albanian government and international organizations have made encouraging tentative steps to this end. The government’s National Referral Mechanism provided micro-credit loans in 2009 to eleven women who were previously trafficked as prostitutes into Western Europe, and UNDP has held several lectures and seminars on business administration and management to access loans throughout Albania, for example in the town of Fier in May 2004[27]. Such schemes, in conjunction with a range of other policy tools, can help to make returning home safer for these trafficked women who manage to escape, and reduce the possibility of their being trafficked in the first instance.

Thus, international and national attempts to combat human trafficking in the Balkans have failed to largely address the issue at source. While prosecuting the traffickers themselves will always be a key cornerstone of action to rid the Balkans of this despicable practice, it must be combined with a strategy that focuses on reducing the number of vulnerable women in each target state. This would represent a much-needed shift in the foreign policy of the majority of actors in the theater of 21^st century world politics; to shift from addressing the security of the state, through these retributive measures, to a focus on human security, through enhancing protection on an individual level, and empowerment of women in these respective societies. Albania represents a typical case of a ‘source’ country for these trafficked women. While the ‘West’ must be wary of cultural imperialism, the U.N. and other such organizations can play a role in changing societal attitudes towards women, and take a long-term approach through education of the youth, rather than seeking quantitative increases in the number of arrested traffickers.

The particular sub-question here regarding successful programs in ‘similar situations’ is framed in an unhelpful way, and promotes a ‘universalist’ approach to combating human trafficking, i.e. to assume that the nature of the problem is the same, or similar, around the world. Consistent with the aforementioned points regarding the cultural and economic factors which facilitate the trafficking of Balkan women to other countries to live a degrading life of forced prostitution and modern-day slavery, there is only a limited amount that successful schemes in other parts of the world can contribute to addressing the problem in the Balkans. There can be no truly ‘similar situations’ to human trafficking in the Balkans.

For example, one could point to the example of Australia, and the success that country has enjoyed in reducing the number of trafficked women in recent years. This has largely been achieved through the 2003 Commonwealth Action Plan to Eradicate Trafficking in Persons, which among other elements, included strategies to ‘develop a reintegration project for trafficking victims who are returned to key source countries in Southeast Asia’, and ‘comprehensive victim support measures provided through…appropriate accommodation and living expenses and access for victims to a wide range of social support, legal, medical and counselling services.[28]’ However, this human trafficking bears little resemblance to the situation in the Balkans. For a start, the problem is of a much smaller scale; 1,000 women trafficked into Australia each year pales in comparison to the estimates of around 200,000 in and from the Balkans[29]. Furthermore, Australia faces merely an influx of trafficked women; many Balkan states are at once a source, a point of transit, and a final destination for these women. As such, the nature of the problem is very different. Thus, only a limited amount can be drawn from successful schemes in different regions, where the root causes of human trafficking are completely at odds with that of any another region. However, even if the precise preventative mechanisms here may not be of direct relevance to the Balkans, the aforementioned ‘human-based security’ concept which is evident here in the policy of assistance to those victims, rather than their speedy deportation, should be a crucial aspect of future policy to halt human trafficking and forced prostitution in the Balkans.

Conclusion

To conclude, both the UN Protocol and the majority of National Action Plans led by governments of various Balkan countries have failed to address the issue of human trafficking. While it would be naive to expect an immediate ‘policy fix’, since the root of the problem is to an extent grounded in, and compounded by, the patriarchal societal nature of many societies in the Balkans – Albania was used as a case study in this essay – the very focus of the majority of legislative efforts so far has been misguided. An over-focus on justice, and the hasty deportation of the victims of trafficking, can even serve to further the ‘vicious cycle’ effect, and entirely neglects the near-inevitability that returning the victims to their countries of origins can lead to their re-absorption into the trade, or even their death. Attempts to address the cultural and economic factors that entrench the problem could prove to be the most effective way to address the issue of human trafficking in the Balkans, and such attempts remain, for the moment, relatively nascent, with inconsistent application in the region.

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[1] Counter-Trafficking Regional Clearing Point, ‘First Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South Eastern Europe’, (Vienna: International Organization for Migration, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, International Catholic Migration Commission, September 2003)

[2] Thacuk, Kimberley L., ‘Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs and Human Life’, (Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007), p. 81

[3] Dragomirescu, Dan Alexandru, Necula, Carmen and Simion, Raluca, ‘Romania: Emerging Market For Trafficking? Clients and Trafficked Women in Romania’, from Di Nicola, Andrea (ed.), ‘Prostitution and Human Trafficking: Focus on Clients’, (New York: Springer Publishers, 2009), p. 124

[4] European Commission, ‘Fight Against Trafficking in Human Beings: Romania’, October 13, 2011, retrieved online December 4, 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/showNIPsection.action;jsessionid=1ptnNngN1Cvv8P4jGThj9Qy9j8dmY7QKZhWKWvSSMKQJYVh7f8v6!-403728570?sectionId=a9eb3934-22fa-4dc2-8977-40191d57e5bb

[5] Burrell, Barbara C., ‘Women and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook’(California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2002), p. 204

[6] Friman, H. Richard and Reich, Simon, ‘Human Trafficking, Human Security, and the Balkans’, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), p. 10

[7] Matthews, Roger, ‘Prostitution, Politics and Policy’, (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008), p. 22

[8] Friman, H. Richard and Reich, Simon, ‘Human Trafficking, Human Security, and the Balkans’, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), p. 5

[9] Obokata, Tom, ‘Trafficking of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective: Towards a Holistic Approach’, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), p. 164

[10] United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, Article 3, Section (a), retrieved online December 9, 2011, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf

[11] Friman, H. Richard and Reich, Simon, ‘Human Trafficking, Human Security, and the Balkans’, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), p. 8

[12] Boudreaux, Richard, ‘Journey Into Sex Slavery’, Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2010, retrieved online December 7, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/17/news/mn-35129

[13] Aronowitz, Alexis A., ‘Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: The Phenomenon, The Markets that Drive It and the Organisations that Promote It’, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 9, No. 2, Fall/Winter 2001, p. 173

[14] United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, Article 6, retrieved online December 9, 2011, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf

[15] United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, Article 7, retrieved online December 9, 2011, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf

[16] Vickers, Miranda and Pettifer, James, ‘The Albanian Question: Reshaping the Balkans’, (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2007), p. 129

[17] Territo, Leonard and Kirkham, George, ‘International Sex Trafficking of Women and Children: Understanding the Global Epidemic’, (New York: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., 2010), p. 115

[18] LaCava, Gloria and Nanetti, Raffaelle, ‘Albania: Filling the Vulnerability Gap’, World Bank Technical Paper No. 480, (Washington, DC: 2000), p. 63

[19] Territo, Leonard and Kirkham, George, ‘International Sex Trafficking of Women and Children: Understanding the Global Epidemic’, (New York: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., 2010), p. 116

[20] Phillips, Anne, ‘Gender and Culture’, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 14

[21] Territo, Leonard and Kirkham, George, ‘International Sex Trafficking of Women and Children: Understanding the Global Epidemic’, (New York: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., 2010), p. 118

[22] Tarifa, Fatos, ‘To Albania, With Love’, (Maryland: Hamilton Books, 2007), p. 26

[23] Zimmerman, Klaus F. And Kahanec, Martin, ‘EU Labor Markets After Post-Enlargement Migration’, (New York: Springer Publishers, 2010), p. 321

[24] Rashid, Mansoora, ‘Household Welfare, The Labor Market, and Social Programs in Albania’, World Bank Technical Paper No. 503, (Washington DC: 2001), p. 22

[25] Van Hook, Mary P., ‘Sexual Trafficking of Women: Tragic Proportions and Attempted Solutions in Albania’, International Social Work, Vol. 49, No. 1, (January, 2006), p. 32

[26] Territo, Leonard and Kirkham, George, ‘International Sex Trafficking of Women and Children: Understanding the Global Epidemic’, (New York: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., 2010), p. 120

[27] Mistry, Natasha, ‘Empowering Citizens for Change’, United Nations Volunteers, October 4, 2004, retrieved online, December 9, 2011, http://www.unv.org/en/what-we-do/countries/albania/doc/empowering-citizens-for-change.html

[28] Murray, John, ‘The Role of Community Policing in Trafficking in Women and Children in Australia’, from Ebbe, Obi N. & Das, Dilip K., (eds.), ‘Global Trafficking in Women and Children’, (Florida: CRC Press, 2008), p. 215

[29] Ibid, p. 210